Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to zkysar1/Claude-Mind. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zkysar1/Claude-Mind/main/.claude/skills/aspirations-state-update/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zkysar1/Claude-MindWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-state-update)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-state-update"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-state-update/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-state-update"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/aspirations-state-update.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 78 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 827 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- high Prompt Injection · line 851 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 304 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 306 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 309 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 313 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00131 | $0.12522 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00066 | $0.06261 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.02504 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.01252 |
Grade A, and why
aspirations-state-update scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 864 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
State Update Protocol
Invoked after EVERY goal execution as Phase 8 of the aspirations loop. Accepts outcome_class (default: "deep").
Abbreviation Policy
Mandatory writes for this obligation: see core/config/obligation-schema.yaml
→ obligations.state. Abbreviation is permitted only when
context_budget.zone == tight. Zone is distance-to-autocompact, not raw
usage — see core/scripts/context-budget-status.py classify_zone for the
source of truth. Before abbreviating, Bash: bash core/scripts/context-budget-banner.sh and quote its output; that line is
the evidence that makes the "tight" claim verifiable. (Routine outcomes
follow the Steps 1-4 + 7r path below — that is a scope-of-work distinction,
NOT the abbreviated pattern.) When abbreviating, log TWO lines in the
journal entry (in this order):
OBLIGATION ABBREVIATED: state — {condition}
CTX: raw N% | of-autocompact N% | zone tight | to-compact N tokens | env ... | updated ...
The banner line must be the actual output captured from the banner script.
core/scripts/context-citation-audit.sh audits the pair. Then satisfy
minimum_inline.
Otherwise invoke this Skill literally. The learning-gate audit (Phase 9.5d)
scans those journal lines and logs false claims to
agents/<agent>/session/obligation-audit.jsonl.
Inputs (from orchestrator)
outcome_class: Outcome tier ("routine"or"deep") — default"deep"source: Queue origin ("world"or"agent") — pass--source {source}to allaspirations-*.shcalls
For deep outcomes (default — all non-routine goals): all steps run (1-8, 8.5, 8.55, 8.75). Step 8 performs IMMEDIATE tree encoding — the full precision manifest, curator quality gate, consistency scan, and tree write. This is the highest-fidelity path. Learning is the mission — every non-routine outcome gets immediate encoding.
For routine outcomes (recurring goal, no findings): Steps 1-4 run (bookkeeping), then an abbreviated Step 7 (journal), then RETURN. Steps 5-8.75 are skipped because there is genuinely no insight to encode, no triggers to check, and no capability to propagate.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed 4a268e0cc8d9
- 8d ago Changed 05fb639d74f6
- 12d ago First seen · 864 lines · 131 tokens per session scan A ce9f574f22de
aspirations-state-update is a skill published in the GitHub repository zkysar1/Claude-Mind (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 131 tokens to every session and 12,522 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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