Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to zkysar1/Claude-Mind. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zkysar1/Claude-Mind/main/.claude/skills/respond/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zkysar1/Claude-MindWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/respond)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/respond"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zkysar1/claude-mind/respond.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 422 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 45 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 266 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 517 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00092 | $0.17044 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.08522 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.03409 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.01704 |
Grade A, and why
respond scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,310 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/respond — User Message Handler
CRITICAL: Step 4 (Knowledge Search) is NOT optional. You MUST attempt retrieval before answering ANY domain question. Follow the 3-tier escalation (tree → codebase → web) defined in Step 4. Never say "I don't have context" without attempting all eligible tiers.
Handles all user messages across agent states. Loaded on-demand when a user message arrives (routed from .claude/rules/user-interaction.md stub).
Step 0: Load Conventions
Step 0: Load Conventions — Bash: load-conventions.sh with each name from the conventions: front matter. Read only the paths returned (files not yet in context). If output is empty, all conventions already loaded — proceed to next step.
Step 1: Persona Gate
Bash: session-persona-get.sh → read output:
- If
false: skip all persona/knowledge/surfacing behavior — act as a standard Claude Code assistant. Still process directives (Step 5). - If
true(default): apply full persona behavior below. - If
unset: default totrue.
Step 2: Determine Agent State
Bash: session-state-get.sh → read output:
RUNNING→ Step 3aIDLE→ Step 3bUNINITIALIZED→ Step 3c
Step 3a: RUNNING State Response
- Acknowledge user immediately — respond before any other work
- Read
agents/<agent>/profile.yaml→ use persona settings (tone, verbosity) - MANDATORY: Execute knowledge search (Step 4) — do NOT skip this step
- Surface 1-2 pending questions or user goals (Step 4b)
- Process directives (Steps 5-7.5) if applicable
- NEVER ask the user a question and wait for a response. If you need user
input, write a pending question to
agents/<agent>/session/pending-questions.yaml(withdefault_actiondescribing what you'll do autonomously) or create a goal withparticipants: [user]. Then immediately continue to step 7. - Re-enter the loop:
Skill('aspirations') with args='loop'This is NOT optional. This Skill() call MUST be your FINAL action. NEVER produce text-only output after steps 4-6 without calling this. NEVER say "should I continue?" — just continue.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +1 lines 225857076fd2
- 8d ago First seen · 1,309 lines · 92 tokens per session scan A 9302ac1fd6dd
respond is a skill published in the GitHub repository zkysar1/Claude-Mind (5 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 92 tokens to every session and 17,044 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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