Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config --skill security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-configWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 39 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.00816 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00408 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00163 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Review
A focused checklist for catching real vulnerabilities in a change set. Apply it to the diff first (the lines that actually changed and the code they call), then widen only if a finding points elsewhere. Report findings; do not rewrite code unless explicitly asked.
Threat checklist
- Injection — untrusted input flowing into SQL, shell, OS commands, eval, template engines, or LDAP. Look for string concatenation instead of parameterized queries / argument arrays.
- XSS — user data rendered into HTML/JS/DOM without escaping. Check
innerHTML,dangerouslySetInnerHTML, unescaped template interpolation. - AuthN / AuthZ — missing authentication, missing ownership/permission checks, IDOR (acting on an object by id without verifying the caller owns it), privilege escalation, trusting client-supplied roles.
- Secrets — hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, or connection strings; secrets logged or committed. Should come from env/secret store, never source.
- Path traversal / file access — user-controlled paths joined without
normalization/allow-listing (
../escapes, symlink following). - SSRF — server-side requests to a user-supplied URL/host without allow-listing; can reach internal metadata endpoints.
- Deserialization / parsing — untrusted data fed to unsafe deserializers (pickle, native YAML loaders, Java/PHP object deserialization).
- Crypto — weak/auto algorithms (MD5/SHA1 for passwords), hardcoded IVs, ECB mode, missing TLS verification, predictable randomness for tokens.
- Sensitive data exposure — PII/secrets in logs, error messages, or API responses; verbose stack traces leaked to clients.
- Dependencies — newly added packages: are they reputable, pinned, and free
of known CVEs? Avoid typosquats. For supply-chain verification, use
gh attestation(see thegh-cliskill). - Resource & DoS — unbounded loops, unbounded request/body sizes, missing timeouts, regex catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS).
- Race conditions / TOCTOU — check-then-act on files, balances, or auth state without locking.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed · +1 lines 258a7ed80e64
- 9d ago First seen · 71 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A f4b2cf2480f0
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository znlgis/my-opencode-deepseek-config (57 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 816 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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