Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add zpoint/vibe-seller --skill browser-harnessgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zpoint/vibe-sellerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zpoint/vibe-seller/browser-harness)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zpoint/vibe-seller/browser-harness"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zpoint/vibe-seller/browser-harness/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zpoint/vibe-seller/browser-harness"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zpoint/vibe-seller/browser-harness.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Agent Snooping · line 8 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 32 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 321 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00083 | $0.05505 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.02753 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01101 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00551 |
Grade A, and why
browser-harness scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 441 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
browser-use 0.13 changed everything. There are no subcommands. You no longer run
browser-use open <url>. Instead you pipe Python helper code tobrowser-usevia a heredoc; helpers are pre-imported and a background daemon is attached automatically.
Store Tasks:
browser-useis a per-store wrapper script that auto-injectsBU_NAME(the store session) andBU_CDP_WS(the store's CDP proxy). You cannot setBU_NAME,BU_CDP_URL,BU_CDP_WS, or--mcpyourself — the wrapper blocks them. Use the default session for the store's seller center, or--session <slug>-auxfor non-seller-center sites (the wrapper maps this to the aux session; no other--sessionvalue is allowed).No-store (orchestrator) Tasks:
browser-useis the store-lesswebwrapper (bin/_web). Use it only for neutral public web work (search, tracking/logistics, research) — NEVER for a store's seller center or to log into store/platform accounts (create a store sub-task for those).
Browser Automation with browser-use (0.13, heredoc interface)
Drive the browser by piping Python to browser-use. Helpers are
pre-imported; the harness calls ensure_daemon() before running your code, so
the browser attaches automatically to the store's CDP endpoint.
browser-use <<'PY'
new_tab("https://example.com") # first navigation is new_tab(), NOT goto
wait_for_load()
print(page_info())
PY
The wrapper takes the heredoc form only — there is no -c flag
(passing one just prints usage). Put every statement inside the heredoc.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 441 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A 0f9826ecd657
browser-harness is a skill published in the GitHub repository zpoint/vibe-seller (66 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 83 tokens to every session and 5,505 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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