Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add Zyrexnn/Cybermes/plugin install Claude-BugHunterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/bug-bounty)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/bug-bounty"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/zyrexnn/cybermes/bug-bounty.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00371 | $0.20372 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00186 | $0.10186 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00074 | $0.04074 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00037 | $0.02037 |
Grade F, and why
bug-bounty scanned grade F with 7 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitHub UI but included i Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Hidden instructionshighPrompt injection
Directives inside HTML comments, invisible characters or bidirectional overrides are read by the model and not by the person reviewing the file.
1. **Trigger + prompt source** — `issues: opened` → AI triage bot reads `github.event.issue.body`. The body IS the prompt. HTML comments (`<!-- ignore previous instructions -->`) are invisible in GitHub UI but included i Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
4. **Payload stealth** — tj-actions memdump.py: extract secrets from Runner.Worker process memory via `/proc/PID/maps` + `/proc/PID/mem`, encrypt with AES+RSA, output to workflow log. Logs are publicly visible but encryp Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
| SSRF (any) | Cloud metadata 169.254.169.254 | IAM credential exfil -> RCE | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://${TARGET}-${suffix}.s3.amazonaws.com/") Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rn "eval(\|innerHTML\|dangerouslySetInner\|execSync" --include="*.ts" --include="*.js" | grep -v node_modules This is a copy
84% identical to bug-bounty — 109 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,604 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Bug Bounty Master Workflow
Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.
THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS
"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"
If the answer is NO -- STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.
Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:
| Pattern | Kill Reason |
|---|---|
| "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug |
| "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions |
| "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug |
| Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug |
| Source maps without secrets | No impact |
| SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access |
| Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain |
| "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |
You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.
CRITICAL RULES
- READ FULL SCOPE FIRST -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
- NO THEORETICAL BUGS -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
- KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
- Validate before writing -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
- One bug class at a time -- go deep, don't spray
- Verify data isn't already public -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
- 5-MINUTE RULE -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
- IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
- CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
- STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
- BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
- UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
- DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
- HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
- ONE-HOUR RULE -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
- TWO-EYE APPROACH -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
- T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 1,604 lines · 371 tokens per session scan F c43e56dc92b0
bug-bounty is a skill published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 371 tokens to every session and 20,372 once invoked, about $0.0019 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it F with 7 findings (instruction-override phrasing, hidden instructions, sends data to an external url). It is 84% identical to bug-bounty, differing in 109 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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