bb-local-toolkit

bb-local-toolkit is a skill for Claude Code from elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter. It costs 460 tokens per session (19,648 once invoked), scanned A, a copy of bug-bounty, MIT.

A local-tools guide for a bug-bounty workflow. Bug bounty work means finding and responsibly reporting security flaws, and this guide also identifies where related tools, wordlists, and code copies are installed on the computer.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when running the complete bug-bounty process and you need local paths for tools such as ffuf, SecLists, trufflehog, or cloned repositories.
Why use it?
It removes the need to search for security tools and files before starting reconnaissance, testing, validation, and reporting.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin. Also seen: reads .claude/ paths; positional $N argument; mentions Claude Code.

Needs its repository: it runs a file that does not travel with it, so clone the repository first. The line is semgrep --config=p/javascript ./src/.

Part of the Claude-BugHunter plugin — 11 skills, 15 commands shipped together

Good fit Use it when running the complete bug-bounty process and you need local paths for tools such as ffuf, SecLists, trufflehog, or cloned repositories.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
About the project

Claude Code Spec Workflow is a set of Claude Code commands and agents that organizes software work into documented stages for new features and bug fixes. It is for developers who want Claude Code to handle requirements, design, implementation, issue resolution, and verification through repeatable workflows, with the catalogue entries providing the associated commands and agents.

elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter · 4,298 stars · on GitHub · elementalsouls.github.io

Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install Claude-BugHunter, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 11 skills, 15 commands.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for bb-local-toolkit

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for bb-local-toolkit

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/elementalsouls/claude-bughunter/bb-local-toolkit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 460 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 19,648 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. ✓ AI security review Sonnet 5 · 6 Sept 2026 📄 Read the review Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 40 findings, up to critical

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • critical YARA Match · line 598
    YARA rule matched a known webshell pattern (PHP, Python, JSP, or ASPX webshell).
    Fix: Remove the webshell code immediately. Webshells provide unauthorized remote command execution. Audit the skill for additional backdoors or persistence mechanisms.
  • high YARA Match · line 3
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
  • high YARA Match · line 3
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 67
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 533
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 549
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 1242
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 1244
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 1251
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Tool Misuse · line 623
    Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
    Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
  • high Prompt Injection · line 742
    This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 940
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • high YARA Match · line 980
    YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
    Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 1037
    Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 1079
    Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
  • high Prompt Injection · line 1100
    This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
  • high Prompt Injection · line 1100
    Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
    Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
  • high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 1248
    Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.
    Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
  • high Privilege Escalation · line 1266
    Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
    Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
  • medium Agent Snooping · line 54
    Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
    Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
How audits are shown
Origin 91% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00460 $0.19648
Opus 5 $0.00230 $0.09824
Sonnet 5 $0.00092 $0.03930
Haiku 4.5 $0.00046 $0.01965

Measured 10d ago against content hash f85ddbd6ddca, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-10, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

bb-local-toolkit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

This is a copy

91% identical to bug-bounty — 87 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

skills/bb-local-toolkit/SKILL.md · 1,559 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,559 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Bug Bounty Master Workflow

Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.

THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS

"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"

If the answer is NO -- STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.

Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:

Pattern Kill Reason
"Could theoretically allow..." Not exploitable = not a bug
"An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." Too many preconditions
"Wrong implementation but no practical impact" Wrong but harmless = not a bug
Dead code with a bug in it Not reachable = not a bug
Source maps without secrets No impact
SSRF with DNS-only callback Need data exfil or internal access
Open redirect alone Need ATO or OAuth chain
"Could be used in a chain if..." Build the chain first, THEN report

You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.


CRITICAL RULES

  1. READ FULL SCOPE FIRST -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
  2. NO THEORETICAL BUGS -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
  3. KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
  4. Validate before writing -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
  5. One bug class at a time -- go deep, don't spray
  6. Verify data isn't already public -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
  7. 5-MINUTE RULE -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
  8. IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
  9. CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
  10. STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
  11. BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
  12. UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
  13. DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
  14. HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
  15. ONE-HOUR RULE -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
  16. TWO-EYE APPROACH -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
  17. T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else

Read the full file on GitHub · 1,559 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 10d ago First seen · 1,559 lines · 460 tokens per session scan F f85ddbd6ddca

Subscribe to this mod's changes

bb-local-toolkit is a skill published in the GitHub repository elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter (4,298 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 460 tokens to every session and 19,648 once invoked, about $0.0023 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 91% identical to bug-bounty, differing in 87 lines, and is treated as a copy.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

bug-bounty

Complete bug bounty workflow — recon (subdomain enumeration, asset discovery, fingerprinting, HackerOne scope, source code audit), pre-hunt learning (disclosed reports, tech stack research, mind maps, threat modeling), vulnerability hunting (IDOR, SSRF, XSS, auth bypass, CSRF, race conditions, SQLi, XXE, file upload…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 371 tokens

web2-vuln-classes

Complete reference for 26 web2 bug classes with root causes, detection patterns, bypass tables, exploit techniques, and real paid examples. Covers IDOR, auth bypass, XSS, SSRF (11 IP bypass techniques), SQLi, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC, file upload (10 bypass techniques), GraphQL, LLM/AI (ASI01-ASI10…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 351 tokens

credential-attack

Password spray methodology for bug bounty — when to do it vs web-vuln hunting, the wordlist-gen + breach-check + osint-employees + spray pipeline, mode selection (http-form / oauth / o365 / okta), rate-limit + lockout tactics, BBP legal guardrails, success detection, and the spray → authenticated /hunt chain pattern.…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 102 tokens

mobile-pentest

Mobile app pentest for bug bounty (Android APK + iOS IPA) — runtime-first workflow: install app, proxy through Burp/mitmproxy, drive the UI, capture packets, then test the API exactly like a web target; escalate to decompile (apktool/jadx) and Frida/objection only when traffic is SSL-pinned, encrypted, or absent.…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 205 tokens

web3-audit

Smart contract security audit — 10 DeFi bug classes (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy), pre-dive kill signals (TVL < $500K etc), Foundry PoC template, grep patterns for each class, and real Immunefi paid examples. Use for…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 103 tokens

graphql-audit

GraphQL security hunting — introspection abuse, field suggestion enumeration (clairvoyance), batching DoS, IDOR via aliasing, auth bypass, injection via arguments, subscription abuse, depth/complexity bombs, and WAF bypass. Covers graphw00f fingerprinting, gqlmap, graphql-cop, and inql. Use when a target exposes a…

Awarexone/Agentic-Bug-Hunter · 92 tokens