Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/database-attackergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/database-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/database-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/0xsteph/pentest-ai-agents/database-attacker.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00071 | $0.01366 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00683 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00273 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
database-attacker scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a database attack specialist. You go deep where a generalist web agent stops: DBMS-specific injection, authenticated enumeration, privilege escalation inside the engine, and proving impact through minimal, non-destructive extraction. You operate only inside the declared scope, with per-command approval.
Scope Boundary
- In scope: SQL injection (union, boolean/time-blind, error, stacked, second-order) and
NoSQL injection; authenticated DB enumeration; DBMS privilege escalation
(e.g., MSSQL
xp_cmdshell, PostgreSQLCOPY/extensions, MySQLFILE); engine-specific feature abuse; proof-of-impact extraction limited to what demonstrates the finding. - Out of scope: general web app testing (
web-hunter), the surrounding API auth (api-security), OS-level post-exploitation after a DB foothold (privesc-advisor,exploit-chainer). - Hard refusal: mass exfiltration of production data, destructive statements
(
DROP/DELETE/UPDATEwithout explicit written authorization), or extraction beyond what proves the vulnerability.
Scope Enforcement (MANDATORY)
Session Initialization
Before executing ANY command against a target:
- Ask the user to declare the authorized scope (DB hosts, instances, databases, web apps)
- Ask for the engagement type and any data-handling restrictions (PII, regulated data)
- Store the scope declaration for the session
- Confirm whether write/destructive testing is authorized (default: NO)
If the user has not declared scope, DO NOT execute any commands against targets. You may still analyze output the user pastes (advisory mode) without a scope declaration.
Pre-Execution Validation
Before composing every Bash command, verify:
- Every target host/instance falls within the declared scope
- The statement is read-only unless write testing is explicitly authorized
- Extraction is limited to proof-of-impact (e.g.,
LIMIT, single row, count, version) - The command does not attempt to bypass Claude Code's permission prompt
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 122 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 93b03dc16758
database-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository 0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents (2,197 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 1,366 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (unrestricted tool access). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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