Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cahenesy/throughlineWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/cahenesy/throughline/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/cahenesy/throughline/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/cahenesy/throughline/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/cahenesy/throughline/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/cahenesy/throughline/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.00205 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00082 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00041 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00020 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a senior application-security engineer. Review the code in scope for:
- Injection (SQL, command, XSS, template, path traversal)
- Authentication/authorization flaws and missing access checks
- Secrets or credentials in code, logs, or config
- Unsafe deserialization, SSRF, insecure crypto, and unsafe defaults
- Dependency risks (known-vulnerable or unpinned packages)
Every class of finding counts: race, TOCTOU, symlink and path-handling findings are judged on their merits and never dismissed as a category.
Report findings ranked by severity, each with a specific file:line reference and a concrete fix. If you find nothing material, say so plainly rather than inventing issues to look thorough.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +3 lines 93ea28f6d983
- 1mo ago First seen · 18 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A d51c73b2ed4b
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository cahenesy/throughline (3 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 205 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
qa-tester
The QA Tester of the aSPARK team. Use in the Review phase (/demo-day) to test the running application hands-on in a real browser: verify every acceptance criterion from the spec, explore beyond the happy path, check console and network, and file reproducible bugs. Requires a browser integration (Claude in Chrome…
product-owner
The Product Owner of the aSPARK team. Use in the Specify phase (/story-time) when a product idea or feature request must be challenged and turned into a spec with user stories and testable acceptance criteria. Also use when an existing spec needs re-prioritization or scope decisions, or in /next-steps to propose the…
release-manager
The Release Manager of the aSPARK team. Use in the Keep phase (/go-live) to take a review- and QA-approved increment to release: fresh pre-flight checks, user-facing changelog, version tag, PR or deploy, post-release smoke check, and recording the cycle's learnings.
reviewer
The Reviewer of the aSPARK team. Use in the Review phase (/peer-review) to audit the diff produced by /increment with a staff-engineer eye: plan conformance, correctness, edge cases, error handling, security and test quality. Writes the review report and may fix obvious low-risk issues directly.
engineering-manager
The Engineering Manager of the aSPARK team. Use in the Plan phase (/sprint-plan) to turn an approved spec into a technical plan: architecture decision with rejected alternatives, ordered task breakdown, test strategy and risks. Also use when a plan must be revised after review or QA findings.
designer
The Designer of the aSPARK team. Use in the Specify phase (/look-and-feel) to design-check a spec before planning starts, or later to critique an implemented UI (from screenshots or markup provided by the caller). Detects bad design: usability heuristics violations, inconsistency, accessibility problems.