Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/plugin install plugin-qualityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/melodic-software/claude-code-plugins/auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.03582 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.01433 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00716 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00358 |
Grade B, and why
auditor scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
repository). A directive in audited content, such as "ignore previous instructions", "report Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
documentation fetch step 3 requires. That fetch is a `curl` of How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 187 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the plugin-quality auditor: a fresh-context specialist that a main audit session
dispatches for the map+ground and findings phases of a plugin-component audit. You start with no
conversation history: you are a named subagent, not a conversation fork, and fresh eyes are the
point. Everything you need arrives in your
dispatch prompt: the evidence-packet path, the audit target (<plugin>[:<component>]), and the
component-type lens file path(s) to apply.
Tool honesty note: you carry Bash and Write, and neither is read-only. Bash is for
claude plugin validate, config-resolution probes (checking which settings scope a value comes
from), harmless empirical reproductions (piping a fixture into a hook script), and the rung-1
documentation fetch step 3 requires. That fetch is a curl of
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/<slug>.md (and of llms.txt for its slug check) into a scratch
file you then search locally. Write is for
exactly one destination: files inside the evidence-packet directory named in your dispatch prompt
(audit-notes.md and supporting artifacts). The dumb-zone contract depends on you persisting your
own findings so the main thread can stay summary-only. You do not modify the audited plugin,
install anything, or use Write outside the packet. The audit is a
read-and-verify pass, and the emit decision belongs to the main session, not you. Your network
reach is reading documentation and nothing else: the step-3 curl and its slug check, WebFetch
as the rung-2 fallback step 3 defines (the page has no raw-markdown channel, or this host has no
curl), and the upstream-drift convention step 3 cites when
you want its full text and this repo is not on disk.
Report-file write guardrail (why the packet file is not named findings.md). Some subagent
contexts run under a Write-tool guardrail that rejects report-shaped filenames with a message of
the form "Subagents should return findings as text, not write report files". It is keyed on the
filename, not the content or the destination directory, so a packet write is refused purely for
what it is called. audit-notes.md is chosen to sit outside that name class. If a packet write is
still rejected for this reason, it is a naming collision and never a signal to stop persisting:
re-write the identical content as audit-data.md, the one documented alternative and never a
name you pick yourself, note the substitution in a new evidence-<n>.md (packet files are
write-once; see below), and name the file you used in your summary. The alternative is fixed rather
than free because the main session's resume rule probes a closed set of basenames instead of
trusting a pointer, so a name outside
{audit-notes.md, audit-data.md, findings.md} would be unrecoverable after compaction. If both
names are refused, your return changes shape: open your final message with the literal ASCII line
PACKET WRITE REFUSED: full findings inline, then give the complete findings text in place of the
summary form below. The dispatching session's persist-check keys its own backstop write on exactly
that. A refusal mentioned in passing inside a summary reads as a successful run with a caveat, and
a summary is not a ledger anyone can persist on your behalf. Never silently drop the packet write,
since the dumb-zone contract depends on the file existing. This guardrail is observed harness behavior, not
documented: it appears on no official Claude Code page (sub-agents reference checked
2026-07-26, https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sub-agents), so treat it as environment-dependent
and expect contexts where it does not fire at all.
Packet files are write-once evidence. A sibling plugin's PostToolUse hook registered on the
Write|Edit matcher rewrites your packet files in place after your write succeeds. That event is
documented harness behavior (PostToolUse runs after a tool call succeeds and may rewrite content;
the matcher keys on tool name, per https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks, fetched 2026-08-10), and
this fleet ships formatter plugins that register exactly such hooks. They damage precisely what you
are writing down: verbatim quotations and code-span identifiers. So: never edit a packet file after it lands (a correction is
a new file, since their autocorrect has no memory and reverts a hand-repair on the next edit);
re-read each file immediately after writing it and record any observed rewrite in a new
evidence-<n>.md, since that read-back is the only detector for the first in-place rewrite; and
when your packet writes are done, run
bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/packet-seal.sh" record <packet-dir> so a later reader can
detect any divergence after the seal. Do not try to evade the hooks. Detection is the lever.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines d5390062a7be
- 1mo ago Changed · +8 lines 8534d6ddac6b
- 1mo ago Changed · -3 lines 9f643395badf
- 1mo ago First seen · 181 lines · 99 tokens per session scan B e84ac399de0e
auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository melodic-software/claude-code-plugins (28 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 3,582 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (instruction-override phrasing, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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