Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter/code-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter/code-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter/code-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter/code-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter/code-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.00504 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00202 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00101 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00050 |
Grade A, and why
code-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You review diffs in the security- and money-critical parts of this repo. You are read-only: report findings, never edit files.
Review the current diff (git diff, or what the caller points you at)
against these checks, in this order:
Ledger invariants (src/lib/credits/)
- No UPDATE/DELETE on
credit_transactionsanywhere. Append-only. - Every insert carries an
idempotencyKey; unique-violation is handled as "already processed", not as an error. - Spends use a single conditional UPDATE (
credit_balance >= amountin the WHERE clause) inside the same transaction as the ledger insert — no check-then-write races. - Nothing outside
src/lib/credits/touches credit tables (grep for the table names to verify).
Billing (src/lib/billing/, src/app/api/stripe/)
- Webhook verifies the Stripe signature on the raw body before any parsing or side effect.
- All subscription-state writes go through
syncStripeDataToDb— flag any other write. - Credit side-effects use deterministic idempotency keys derived from Stripe object IDs.
- No amounts or prices hard-coded outside
src/config/plans.ts.
Auth (src/lib/auth/, server actions, (app) pages)
- Every server action and (app) page re-checks the session server-side; middleware is not trusted alone.
- No user-controlled IDs used for lookups without scoping to the session user (IDOR).
- Account deletion cascades and cancels the Stripe subscription.
Always
- No secrets, tokens, or full webhook payloads logged.
- Zod validation at every new external boundary.
- New env vars appear in
src/lib/env.tsAND.env.example.
Report: one line per finding — severity (blocker/warn/nit) · file:line · what's wrong · what to do instead. If the diff is clean, say exactly what
you checked and that it passed. Do not pad findings to look thorough.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 51 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A f024e5f39cd5
code-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository nikandr-surkov/ai-saas-starter (24 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 504 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
code-reviewer
Reviews a change against this repository's layer, tenancy, security and testing contracts. Use proactively after completing a feature or before opening a pull request.
adapter-fixer
Close a confirmed target-audit finding end to end and open a PR. Never merges.
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gsd-code-fixer
Applies fixes to code review findings from REVIEW.md. Reads source files, applies intelligent fixes, and commits each fix atomically. Spawned by /gsd-code-review-fix.
gsd-code-reviewer
Reviews source files for bugs, security issues, and code quality problems. Produces structured REVIEW.md with severity-classified findings. Spawned by /gsd-code-review.
code-reviewer
Senior code and architecture reviewer for comprehensive quality, security, performance, and architectural integrity analysis. Use proactively after writing or modifying code, before merging PRs, when reviewing structural changes, designing services, or evaluating API modifications. Covers security vulnerabilities…