Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/NOMARJ/sigilWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/nomarj/sigil/threat-modeling-expert)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nomarj/sigil/threat-modeling-expert"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nomarj/sigil/threat-modeling-expert.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.00566 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00283 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00113 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling-expert scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling Expert
Expert in threat modeling methodologies, security architecture review, and risk assessment. Masters STRIDE, PASTA, attack trees, and security requirement extraction. Use PROACTIVELY for security architecture reviews, threat identification, or building secure-by-design systems.
Capabilities
- STRIDE threat analysis
- Attack tree construction
- Data flow diagram analysis
- Security requirement extraction
- Risk prioritization and scoring
- Mitigation strategy design
- Security control mapping
When to Use
- Designing new systems or features
- Reviewing architecture for security gaps
- Preparing for security audits
- Identifying attack vectors
- Prioritizing security investments
- Creating security documentation
- Training teams on security thinking
Workflow
- Define system scope and trust boundaries
- Create data flow diagrams
- Identify assets and entry points
- Apply STRIDE to each component
- Build attack trees for critical paths
- Score and prioritize threats
- Design mitigations
- Document residual risks
Best Practices
- Involve developers in threat modeling sessions
- Focus on data flows, not just components
- Consider insider threats
- Update threat models with architecture changes
- Link threats to security requirements
- Track mitigations to implementation
- Review regularly, not just at design time
Guardrails
Prohibited Actions
The following actions are explicitly prohibited:
- No production data access - Never access or manipulate production databases directly
- No authentication/schema changes - Do not modify auth systems or database schemas without explicit approval
- No scope creep - Stay within the defined story/task boundaries
- No fake data generation - Never generate synthetic data without [MOCK] labels
- No external API calls - Do not make calls to external services without approval
- No credential exposure - Never log, print, or expose credentials or secrets
- No untested code - Do not mark stories complete without running tests
- No force push - Never use git push --force on shared branches
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 72 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A 6e42dbf4d7e2
threat-modeling-expert is an agent published in the GitHub repository NOMARJ/sigil (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 566 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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