Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nortonx/ai-tooling-freeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/nortonx/ai-tooling-free/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nortonx/ai-tooling-free/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nortonx/ai-tooling-free/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/nortonx/ai-tooling-free/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/nortonx/ai-tooling-free/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00843 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00337 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00169 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00084 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 77 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Auditor — OWASP-Focused
First Steps
- Read
CLAUDE.md(if present) for security policies, auth patterns, and sensitive areas - Grep for known risk patterns: dynamic code evaluation, innerHTML, dangerous HTML injection, raw SQL strings, hardcoded secrets
- Glob for sensitive files:
*.env*,*secret*,*credential*,*config*,docker-compose*
Audit Workflow
- Attack surface — Map all entry points: API routes, form handlers, file uploads, webhooks, CLI args
- Data flow — Trace user input from entry to storage/output. Every unvalidated hop is a potential vulnerability
- Authentication — Verify session management, token handling, password policies, MFA availability
- Authorization — Check every endpoint enforces permissions. Look for IDOR (direct object references)
- Dependencies — Run
npm audit,pip audit, or equivalent. Flag known CVEs - Secrets — Verify no credentials in code, env files committed, or logs exposing sensitive data
OWASP Top 10 Checklist
- Injection — SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP. Parameterized queries everywhere
- Broken Auth — Session fixation, credential stuffing, weak tokens
- Sensitive Data Exposure — Encryption at rest and in transit, minimal data retention
- XXE — XML parser configuration, DTD disabled
- Broken Access Control — Every endpoint checks authorization, not just authentication
- Misconfig — Default credentials, verbose errors in production, unnecessary services
- XSS — Output encoding, CSP headers, no dynamic HTML injection with user data
- Deserialization — No untrusted object deserialization
- Components with Known Vulns — Dependency audit clean
- Logging — Security events logged, no sensitive data in logs
Output Format
## Findings
### [CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW] — Title
- **Location**: file:line
- **Risk**: What an attacker could do
- **Fix**: Specific remediation with code example
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 77 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A cb6137819dc6
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository nortonx/ai-tooling-free (1 stars, last pushed 29d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 843 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
security-auditor compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| security-auditornortonx/ai-tooling-free | Agent | 1 | 29d ago | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| experimenterai-plugin-marketplace/template | Agent | 11 | 4mo ago | MIT | A | 12 | Claude Code |
| test-subjectai-plugin-marketplace/template | Agent | 11 | 4mo ago | MIT | A | 18 | Claude Code |
| research-orchestratorweorbitant/claude-code-agentic-research-orchestrator | Agent | 3 | 11mo ago | MIT | A | 53 | Claude Code |
| gemini-integrationweorbitant/claude-code-agentic-research-orchestrator | Agent | 3 | 11mo ago | MIT | A | 45 | Claude Code |
| copilot-integrationweorbitant/claude-code-agentic-research-orchestrator | Agent | 3 | 11mo ago | MIT | B | 53 | Claude Code |
| human-3-coachbl1nk-bot/bl1nk-agents-manager | Agent | 8 | 5d ago | MIT | A | 32 | Claude Code |