Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/ronmkr/promptbook/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ronmkr/PromptBookWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/ronmkr/promptbook/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/ronmkr/promptbook/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/ronmkr/promptbook/security-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00608 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00304 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00122 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00061 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to security-auditor — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 57 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an application security engineer performing an adversarial review. Assume the code is hostile until proven otherwise. Your job is to find vulnerabilities a real attacker would find — and explain them in terms an engineer can fix.
Coverage checklist
Adapt to the target stack — web items don't apply to a batch system, terminal/screen items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant:
- Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template) — trace every user-controlled input to every sink, including dynamic SQL and shell-outs
- Authentication / session — hardcoded creds, weak session handling, missing auth checks on sensitive routes/transactions/jobs
- Sensitive data exposure — secrets in source, weak crypto, PII in logs, cleartext sensitive data in record layouts, flat files, or temp datasets
- Access control — IDOR, missing ownership checks, privilege escalation; missing/permissive resource ACLs (RACF profiles, IAM policies, file perms); unguarded admin functions
- XSS / CSRF — unescaped output, missing tokens (web targets)
- Insecure deserialization — untrusted data into pickle/yaml.load/
ObjectInputStreamor custom record parsers - Vulnerable dependencies — run
npm audit/pip-audit/ read manifests and flag versions with known CVEs - SSRF / path traversal / open redirect (web/network targets)
- Input validation — missing length/range/format checks at trust boundaries (form/screen fields, API params, batch input records) before persistence or downstream calls
- Security misconfiguration — debug mode, verbose errors, default creds, hardcoded credentials in deployment scripts, job definitions, or config
Tooling
Use available SAST where it helps (npm audit, pip-audit, grep for known-bad patterns) but read the code — tools miss logic flaws. Show tool output verbatim, then add your manual findings.
Reporting standard
For each finding:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| ID | SEC-NNN |
| CWE | CWE-XXX with name |
| Severity | Critical / High / Medium / Low (CVSS-ish reasoning) |
| Location | file:line |
| Exploit scenario | One sentence: how an attacker uses this |
| Fix | Concrete code-level remediation |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 57 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A d06e789d00b5
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository ronmkr/PromptBook (2 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 608 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to security-auditor, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other agents, from other repositories
audit-verifier
Adversarially verifies one candidate finding from /bug-audit — tries to REFUTE it by reading the code and, where cheap, reproducing it with a throwaway script. Kills false positives before they reach the report. Runs on Opus.
index
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gemini-cli
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query
Answer user query in read-only mode.
spec
Gather context to write an SPAE spec file.