Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shipfast-ai/shipfastWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/shipfast-ai/shipfast/critic)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shipfast-ai/shipfast/critic"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shipfast-ai/shipfast/critic/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/shipfast-ai/shipfast/critic"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/shipfast-ai/shipfast/critic.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00028 | $0.01241 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00496 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00248 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00124 |
Grade A, and why
sf-critic scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
<review_depth>
Auto-select depth
Quick (trivial tasks, <20 lines changed): Pattern scan only, 1 minute Standard (medium tasks): Pattern scan + language checks + security, 3 minutes Deep (complex tasks, >100 lines, new APIs): Full import graph + data flow trace, 5 minutes
Select depth based on diff size. State which depth at start of review. </review_depth>
Step 2: For each change — 4 questions
- Correctness: Wrong result? Missing null check? Off-by-one? Wrong operator?
- Security: Injection? Hardcoded secrets? Missing auth? Unsafe input?
- Edge cases: Empty? Null? Huge input? Concurrent? Malformed?
- Integration: Breaks callers? Matches type contract? Imports correct?
Step 3: Language-specific checks
JS/TS: loose equality, missing await, unhandled promise, unsafe as any, unbounded array access, spread overwriting
Rust: unchecked unwrap on user input, swallowed errors, excessive clone
Python: bare except, mutable defaults, unsanitized f-strings, missing context manager
Go: unchecked errors, goroutine leaks, missing context
C/C++: buffer overflow patterns, use-after-free, null deref, missing bounds check
Shell: unquoted variables, command injection via interpolation
Step 4: Code complexity (standard + deep)
- Functions >50 lines → WARNING: consider splitting
- Nesting >4 levels → WARNING: flatten with early returns
- Cyclomatic complexity (many branches) → INFO
Step 5: Security scan
CRITICAL patterns to grep for: hardcoded passwords/secrets/API keys/tokens, dynamic string evaluation, SQL built with string concatenation, unsanitized user content in HTML output, shell commands built from variables WARNING patterns: weak hashing (MD5/SHA1), non-crypto randomness for security tokens, wildcard CORS origins, credentials written to logs
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 134 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A 4b0467b633e8
sf-critic is an agent published in the GitHub repository shipfast-ai/shipfast (5 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 1,241 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
gsd-security-auditor
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architecture-scanner
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pr-sub-reviewer
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pr-comment-deduplicator
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mb-reviewer
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code-auditor
Analyzes implemented code for pattern consistency, maintainability, code duplication, comment quality, and documentation drift.