Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to 0xSoftBoi/suwappubot. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xSoftBoi/suwappubot/main/.claude/commands/audit.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xSoftBoi/suwappubotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/0xsoftboi/suwappubot/audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/0xsoftboi/suwappubot/audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/0xsoftboi/suwappubot/audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.00746 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00373 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00149 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00075 |
Grade A, and why
audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 55 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Audit Skill
Runs the deep, adversarial review you commission by hand — but with the two habits that keep it from dying at a spend/output limit: scope tightly and stream findings as you confirm them.
Optional args: target files/globs and an optional attack class (auth-bypass, replay, double-spend, idor, ssrf, secret-exposure, fee-math). If no target given, ask for candidate files — do NOT "audit everything."
Ground rules (why this skill exists)
- Never batch findings for the end. Append each confirmed finding to
findings.jsonthe moment you verify it. Spend limits repeatedly killed audits that saved the JSON for last and lost the whole deliverable. - Keep each response compact (< ~500 output tokens). One finding at a time is fine.
- Real bug vs false positive must be stated explicitly for each item.
- This is a money-path / auth review — trace data flow from route → service → DB, not just single files.
Step 0 — Scope + init the sink
TARGETS="$ARGUMENTS" # files/globs passed to /audit
[ -z "$TARGETS" ] && echo "No target — ask user for candidate files, then stop." && exit 0
[ -f findings.json ] || echo '[]' > findings.json
echo "Auditing: $TARGETS"
Step 1 — Route by attack class
For each target, trace at minimum:
- Auth/authz: who can call this? Is the caller's identity re-derived from a trusted source or trusted from client input? IDOR on any id param?
- Money-path: balance reads vs writes — any TOCTOU / double-spend race? Idempotency on payment/withdraw/redeem? Replay of a signed request?
- Input: SSRF on any outbound URL, injection into DB/shell, unvalidated amounts (negative, overflow, precision).
- Secrets: keys/tokens logged, returned in responses, or committed.
Step 2 — Confirm, then append IMMEDIATELY
For each confirmed finding, append one object and report it in one short message:
python3 - <<'PY'
import json
f = json.load(open("findings.json"))
f.append({
"severity": "critical|high|medium|low",
"location": "path/to/file.py:123",
"attack_class": "double-spend",
"real_or_fp": "real", # or "false-positive" with reasoning
"exploit": "one-line attacker path",
"fix": "one-line remediation",
})
json.dump(f, open("findings.json","w"), indent=2)
print("appended:", f[-1]["location"])
PY
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 55 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A c78b7ddf59ac
audit is a command published in the GitHub repository 0xSoftBoi/suwappubot (3 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 746 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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