Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-toolingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling/adversarial)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling/adversarial"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling/adversarial/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling/adversarial"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling/adversarial.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.00188 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00075 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00038 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00019 |
Grade A, and why
adversarial scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
/adversarial
Single-lens review using just the adversarial-reviewer agent. Use when you specifically want the "is this the right thing?" lens and don't need simplification or robustness analysis.
Usage
/adversarial <target>
What happens
- Spawn
adversarial-reviewer(Opus) against the target - Return numbered findings grouped by Critical / High / Medium / Low
When to use this instead of /quality-review
- The target is already known to be simple — you want the reasoning lens, not KISS
- You need the strongest reasoning model (Opus) and don't want it diluted by parallel synthesis
- The proposal has already passed simplifier review and you're stress-testing the logic
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago Changed 68b16ba716b0
- 1mo ago First seen · 25 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A 8d58735380d0
adversarial is a command published in the GitHub repository shawnclybor/clybor-claude-tooling (6 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 188 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
audit
Review past Claude Code sessions for PBR workflow compliance and UX quality.
code-audit
Adversarial code review tree. Wraps /cc-tree:tree with the code-audit preset preselected — finds security / performance / correctness / contract findings a static linter would miss. Every finding carries file:line evidence + threat-model context + proposedfix; hard-banned against NEEDS-MORE-INFO deferrals.…
review-csk
Review pass — review + security + quality gates.
sonar
A command for running SonarQube, a tool that examines source code for quality and security problems. It can show current results, rerun the analysis, inspect security hotspots, check test coverage, and explain quality-gate results.
mise-en-place
Autonomous backlog run — flight-recorder prep, then run-through.
distill
Distill session artifacts to wiki and decisions; archive specs, drop scratch.