Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add 0dayInc/pwn --skill exploitdevgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0dayInc/pwnWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/0dayinc/pwn/exploitdev)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/0dayinc/pwn/exploitdev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/0dayinc/pwn/exploitdev/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/0dayinc/pwn/exploitdev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/0dayinc/pwn/exploitdev.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.00384 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00192 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00077 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00038 |
Grade A, and why
exploitdev scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Exploit development
Use PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev from pwn_eval — do not shell out to pwntools unless a plugin method is missing.
Packing
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.p32(value: 0x41414141)
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.p64(value: addr, endian: :little)
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.flat(parts: [0xdeadbeef, "A" * 32, 0x401000])
Cyclic
pattern = PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.cyclic(length: 200)
offset = PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.cyclic_find(value: "Aa0A", length: 200)
Shellcode / ROP
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.shellcode(arch: 'x86_64', kind: 'execve_bin_sh')
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.gadgets(path: '/path/to/binary')
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.one_gadget(path: '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
PWN::Plugins::ExploitDev.libc_offsets(path: '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')
Interactive
PWN::Plugins::ProcessTube.spawn or .connect then write_line / recvuntil.
PWN::Plugins::GDB.run_to_crash / .breakpoints / .core.
PWN::Plugins::Radare2.open then cmd (text) or cmdj (JSON).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 39 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 04820aaa9cc7
exploitdev is a skill published in the GitHub repository 0dayInc/pwn (81 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 384 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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