Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add 26zl/cybersec-toolkit --skill bounty-apigit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/26zl/cybersec-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-api)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-api"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-api/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-api"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bounty-api.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 66 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high YARA Match · line 132 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 22 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00077 | $0.01303 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00651 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00261 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00130 |
Grade A, and why
bounty-api scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -X POST https://target.com/graphql -d '{"query":"{__schema{types{name}}}"}' Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl https://target.com/swagger.json How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 137 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Bug bounty API testing
1. Discover the API
# Mobile app reverse → APK / IPA → look for endpoints
# JS bundle inspection
katana -u https://target.com -jc -silent | grep -E "/api/|/v1/|/graphql"
LinkFinder -i https://target.com/app.js -o cli
# Common paths
ffuf -w api-paths.txt -u https://target.com/FUZZ -mc 200,401,403
# /api, /api/v1, /v1, /graphql, /rest, /rpc, /swagger.json, /openapi.json,
# /api-docs, /redoc, /docs, /.well-known/
# Schema endpoints (huge if found)
curl https://target.com/swagger.json
curl https://target.com/openapi.json
curl -X POST https://target.com/graphql -d '{"query":"{__schema{types{name}}}"}'
If you find a swagger/openapi/graphql introspection — that IS the attack surface map. Use kiterunner to brute API routes if not.
2. OWASP API Top 10 — checklist per endpoint
API1: Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
For every endpoint with an ID:
# Login as user A. Get user B's resource.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $A_TOKEN" https://api/users/$B_ID
Try: numeric→numeric swap, UUID enumeration via Wayback/JS, encoded ID decoding.
API2: Broken Authentication
- Missing / weak JWT verification
- Token reuse after logout
- Refresh-token abuse
- Hardcoded API keys in mobile bundles
API3: Broken Object Property Level (Mass Assignment + Excessive Data Exposure)
Mass assignment:
# Sign-up sends: {"email": "...", "password": "..."}
# Try: {"email": "...", "password": "...", "is_admin": true, "role": "admin"}
Excessive exposure: GET /users/me returns entire user object including hashed password / secret_question_answer / internal_notes — report it.
API4: Unrestricted Resource Consumption
Endpoints that allow ?limit=99999, deeply nested GraphQL queries, expensive operations without rate limit.
API5: Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA)
Admin endpoints (POST /admin/users, DELETE /admin/posts/N) accessed as regular user.
API6: Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 137 lines · 77 tokens per session scan A cf306652da76
bounty-api is a skill published in the GitHub repository 26zl/cybersec-toolkit (49 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 77 tokens to every session and 1,303 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
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project-settings-cascade
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detecting-api-enumeration-attacks
Detect and prevent API enumeration attacks including BOLA and IDOR exploitation by monitoring sequential identifier access patterns and authorization failures.
detecting-broken-object-property-level-authorization
Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization vulnerabilities including excessive data exposure and mass assignment attacks.
exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization
Tests APIs for Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) vulnerabilities where regular users can invoke administrative functions or access privileged API endpoints by directly calling them. The tester identifies admin and privileged endpoints, then attempts to access them with regular user credentials by manipulating…
exploiting-excessive-data-exposure-in-api
Tests APIs for excessive data exposure where endpoints return more data than the client application needs, relying on the frontend to filter sensitive fields. The tester intercepts API responses and analyzes them for leaked PII, internal identifiers, debug information, or sensitive business data that the UI does not…