Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/26zl/cybersec-toolkitnpx agentmods add skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bountyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bounty)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bounty"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bounty/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bounty"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/26zl/cybersec-toolkit/bug-bounty.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00276 | $0.20122 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00110 | $0.08049 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00055 | $0.04024 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00028 | $0.02012 |
Grade A, and why
bug-bounty scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
89% identical to bug-bounty — 82 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,593 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Vendored note (this repo). Adapted from the standalone claude-bug-bounty project. The upstream executable scaffolding — helper scripts (
tools/*.py,tools/*.sh), the standalonewordlists/pipeline, and slash-commands (/recon,/hunt,/validate,/report, …) — is not bundled here: run tooling through the MCP server (run_tool/run_pipeline/run_script) and install via the project installer/registry. Any static deep-dive files this skill needs are vendored into its ownreferences/folder, and cross-skill references resolve by skill name (e.g. thebb-methodologyskill). Some named tools may not be intools_config.jsonyet — add them with theadd-toolskill or install upstream.
Bug Bounty Master Workflow
Full pipeline: Recon -> Learn -> Hunt -> Validate -> Report. One skill for everything.
THE ONLY QUESTION THAT MATTERS
"Can an attacker do this RIGHT NOW against a real user who has taken NO unusual actions -- and does it cause real harm (stolen money, leaked PII, account takeover, code execution)?"
If the answer is NO -- STOP. Do not write. Do not explore further. Move on.
Theoretical Bug = Wasted Time. Kill These Immediately:
| Pattern | Kill Reason |
|---|---|
| "Could theoretically allow..." | Not exploitable = not a bug |
| "An attacker with X, Y, Z conditions could..." | Too many preconditions |
| "Wrong implementation but no practical impact" | Wrong but harmless = not a bug |
| Dead code with a bug in it | Not reachable = not a bug |
| Source maps without secrets | No impact |
| SSRF with DNS-only callback | Need data exfil or internal access |
| Open redirect alone | Need ATO or OAuth chain |
| "Could be used in a chain if..." | Build the chain first, THEN report |
You must demonstrate actual harm. "Could" is not a bug. Prove it works or drop it.
CRITICAL RULES
- READ FULL SCOPE FIRST -- verify every asset/domain is owned by the target org
- NO THEORETICAL BUGS -- "Can an attacker steal funds, leak PII, takeover account, or execute code RIGHT NOW?" If no, STOP.
- KILL WEAK FINDINGS FAST -- run the 7-Question Gate BEFORE writing any report
- Validate before writing -- check CHANGELOG, design docs, deployment scripts FIRST
- One bug class at a time -- go deep, don't spray
- Verify data isn't already public -- check web UI in incognito before reporting API "leaks"
- 5-MINUTE RULE -- if a target shows nothing after 5 min probing (all 401/403/404), MOVE ON
- IMPACT-FIRST HUNTING -- ask "what's the worst thing if auth was broken?" If nothing valuable, skip target
- CREDENTIAL LEAKS need exploitation proof -- finding keys isn't enough, must PROVE what they access
- STOP SHALLOW RECON SPIRALS -- don't probe 403s, don't grep for analytics keys, don't check staging domains that lead nowhere
- BUSINESS IMPACT over vuln class -- severity depends on CONTEXT, not just vuln type
- UNDERSTAND THE TARGET DEEPLY -- before hunting, learn the app like a real user
- DON'T OVER-RELY ON AUTOMATION -- automated scans hit WAFs, trigger rate limits, find the same bugs everyone else finds
- HUNT LESS-SATURATED VULN CLASSES -- XSS/SSRF/XXE have the most competition. Expand into: cache poisoning, Android/mobile vulns, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC chains, CI/CD pipeline attacks
- ONE-HOUR RULE -- stuck on one target for an hour with no progress? SWITCH CONTEXT
- TWO-EYE APPROACH -- combine systematic testing (checklist) with anomaly detection (watch for unexpected behavior)
- T-SHAPED KNOWLEDGE -- go DEEP in one area and BROAD across everything else
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 1,593 lines · 276 tokens per session scan F 58a610e42966
bug-bounty is a skill published in the GitHub repository 26zl/cybersec-toolkit (76 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 276 tokens to every session and 20,122 once invoked, about $0.0011 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 89% identical to bug-bounty, differing in 82 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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