sysmon-process-creation-analysis

sysmon-process-creation-analysis is a skill for Claude Code from akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills. It costs 48 tokens per session (1,113 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A guide to analyzing Sysmon Event ID 1 records, which describe processes created on Windows, including their command lines and parent processes.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for threat hunting and incident response focused on execution flow, obfuscated commands, and unusual parent-child process relationships.
Why use it?
It helps investigators trace how malware, scripts, and built-in tools were launched and identify suspicious command-line activity.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is > - [`_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md`](../_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md) — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain pat.

Part of the cyberskills-elite plugin — 191 skills shipped together

Good fit It is for threat hunting and incident response focused on execution flow, obfuscated commands, and unusual parent-child process relationships.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install cyberskills-elite, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 191 skills.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

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README.md
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Per session 48 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,113 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00048 $0.01113
Opus 5 $0.00024 $0.00557
Sonnet 5 $0.00010 $0.00223
Haiku 4.5 $0.00005 $0.00111

Measured 9d ago against content hash 1e0131362e48, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-12, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

sysmon-process-creation-analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

The scan reads SKILL.md. This mod also ships 1 executable file (scripts/process.py), listed below but not scanned — reading those needs a real analyzer, not pattern matching.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/incident-response/forensics/sysmon-process-creation-analysis/SKILL.md · 119 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Sysmon Process Creation Analysis (Event ID 1)

When to Use

  • During proactive threat hunting or reactive incident response to trace the execution flow of malware, scripts, or attacker activity.
  • To detect the use of LOLBins (like PowerShell, cmd, certutil) and identify obfuscated command-line arguments indicating malicious intent.

Prerequisites

  • Forensic image or live access to the affected system(s)
  • Forensic workstation with analysis tools (Autopsy, Volatility, Timeline Explorer)
  • Chain of custody documentation initiated for evidence handling
  • Write-blocker for disk forensics or memory acquisition tool (e.g., DumpIt, WinPmem)

Workflow

Phase 1: Understanding Event ID 1 Fields

# Concept: Sysmon Event ID 1 ```

### Phase 2: Hunting for Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships

```powershell
# Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" | Where-Object { 
  $_.Id -eq 1 -and $_.Message -match "ParentImage:.*winword.exe" -and $_.Message -match "Image:.*(?:powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe)" 
} | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List

Phase 3: Detecting Command-Line Obfuscation and Encoding

# index=sysmon EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*-e*" OR CommandLine="*-enc*" OR CommandLine="*-EncodedCommand*") Image="*\\powershell.exe"
| table _time, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine

Phase 4: Hunting for Known LOLBins (Living Off The Land)

# index=sysmon EventCode=1 (Image="*\\certutil.exe" AND (CommandLine="*-urlcache*" OR CommandLine="*-f*" OR CommandLine="*-split*"))
| stats count by CommandLine, User, Computer
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
    A[Analyze Event ] --> B{Suspicious Indicator? ]}
    B -->|Yes| C[Investigate Context ]
    B -->|No| D[Log as Benign ]
    C --> E[Extract Artifacts ]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

  • Filter Tuning: Contextual Baselines: - Correlation Rules: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|

Output Format

Sysmon Process Creation Analysis — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]

Read the full file on GitHub · 119 lines

Files

What ships with it

2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 119 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 1e0131362e48

Subscribe to this mod's changes

sysmon-process-creation-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 1,113 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.

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