Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysisWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills/sysmon-process-creation-analysis.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.01113 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00557 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00223 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00111 |
Grade A, and why
sysmon-process-creation-analysis scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Sysmon Process Creation Analysis (Event ID 1)
When to Use
- During proactive threat hunting or reactive incident response to trace the execution flow of malware, scripts, or attacker activity.
- To detect the use of LOLBins (like PowerShell, cmd, certutil) and identify obfuscated command-line arguments indicating malicious intent.
Prerequisites
- Forensic image or live access to the affected system(s)
- Forensic workstation with analysis tools (Autopsy, Volatility, Timeline Explorer)
- Chain of custody documentation initiated for evidence handling
- Write-blocker for disk forensics or memory acquisition tool (e.g., DumpIt, WinPmem)
Workflow
Phase 1: Understanding Event ID 1 Fields
# Concept: Sysmon Event ID 1 ```
### Phase 2: Hunting for Suspicious Parent-Child Relationships
```powershell
# Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" | Where-Object {
$_.Id -eq 1 -and $_.Message -match "ParentImage:.*winword.exe" -and $_.Message -match "Image:.*(?:powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe)"
} | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
Phase 3: Detecting Command-Line Obfuscation and Encoding
# index=sysmon EventCode=1 (CommandLine="*-e*" OR CommandLine="*-enc*" OR CommandLine="*-EncodedCommand*") Image="*\\powershell.exe"
| table _time, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine
Phase 4: Hunting for Known LOLBins (Living Off The Land)
# index=sysmon EventCode=1 (Image="*\\certutil.exe" AND (CommandLine="*-urlcache*" OR CommandLine="*-f*" OR CommandLine="*-split*"))
| stats count by CommandLine, User, Computer
Decision Point 🔀
flowchart TD
A[Analyze Event ] --> B{Suspicious Indicator? ]}
B -->|Yes| C[Investigate Context ]
B -->|No| D[Log as Benign ]
C --> E[Extract Artifacts ]
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
- Filter Tuning: Contextual Baselines: - Correlation Rules: Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------|
Output Format
Sysmon Process Creation Analysis — Assessment Report
============================================================
Target: [Target identifier]
Assessor: [Operator name]
Date: [Assessment date]
Scope: [Authorized scope]
MITRE ATT&CK: [Relevant technique IDs]
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 119 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 1e0131362e48
sysmon-process-creation-analysis is a skill published in the GitHub repository akashrpatil/awesome-offensive-security-skills (5 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 1,113 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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