Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windowsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.00710 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00355 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Hunting LOLBin Abuse on Windows
When to Use
- You have process-creation telemetry (Sysmon Event ID 1 or EDR process events as CSV/JSON) and want to surface trusted binaries used for malicious proxy execution or download.
- You are building a detection from known LOLBin argument patterns.
Do not use this as a blocklist of the binaries themselves — they are legitimate. Hunt on the suspicious argument/parent context, not mere presence.
Prerequisites
- Process-creation events with image path, command line, and (ideally) parent image.
Workflow
Step 1: Score LOLBin invocations
python scripts/analyst.py hunt events.csv
Flags known LOLBins (certutil, mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, bitsadmin, msiexec,
installutil, wmic) paired with suspicious arguments (-urlcache, http, javascript:,
scrobj, -decode, DownloadString).
Step 2: Add context
Weight by anomalous parent (Office, browser, script host) and unusual execution path.
Step 3: Triage and confirm
Investigate the top-scoring events; confirm whether the download/proxy behavior is legitimate administration or malicious.
Step 4: Operationalize
Convert confirmed patterns into a Sigma rule for ongoing detection.
Validation
- Flags require a suspicious argument/parent, not just the binary name.
- Known-benign administrative patterns are distinguishable from abuse in the output.
- Each flagged technique maps to an ATT&CK ID (T1218.x / T1105).
Pitfalls
- Alerting on
rundll32/regsvr32presence alone — extremely noisy. - Missing renamed LOLBins (hash/signature checks help, name checks do not).
- Encoded-command obfuscation hiding the true argument intent.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the hunter. - ATT&CK T1218 and the LOLBAS project (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 88 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A c31b306b8421
hunting-lolbin-abuse-on-windows is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 710 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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