skill-upper

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Tool Misuse · line 80
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Tool Misuse · line 83
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Tool Misuse · line 86
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Privilege Escalation · line 150
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• medium Rogue Agent · line 123
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
• medium Excessive Agency · line 156
  Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
  Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
• low Excessive Agency · line 37
  Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.
  Fix: Limit the skill's scope to its documented purpose. Remove instructions that enable the agent to perform actions outside its stated functionality.
• low Supply Chain · line 80
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• low Supply Chain · line 83
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• low Supply Chain · line 86
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.