Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to AlphaBitCore/nexus-gateway. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AlphaBitCore/nexus-gateway/main/.claude/skills/run-local/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AlphaBitCore/nexus-gatewayWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/alphabitcore/nexus-gateway/run-local)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/alphabitcore/nexus-gateway/run-local"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/alphabitcore/nexus-gateway/run-local.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 14 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 18 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 85 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 179 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 180 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 191 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 8 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 136 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 73 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Rogue Agent · line 99 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 104 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 109 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 114 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 159 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 162 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00111 | $0.03096 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00056 | $0.01548 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00619 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00310 |
Grade A, and why
run-local scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" http://localhost:3000/ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 228 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Run Local
Goal: take a fresh clone (or a dirty workspace) of Nexus Gateway and end with 5 services listening on the documented ports, ready for an admin login at http://localhost:3000. Every step has a guard so the model can self-heal rather than hand back to the user.
This skill is the user-facing complement to scripts/dev-start.sh: the script handles the Docker / DB / .env bootstrap; this skill drives the rest (start the four Go services with the right flags, verify each one, surface the few errors that need user input).
Goal first, plan second (binding pattern)
Before any tool call, restate to the user in one line: "Goal: bring up the 5 local services. Plan: bootstrap → start Hub → CP → AI GW → Proxy → UI, verify each port, smoke health." If the user adds a constraint mid-stream (different branch / dirty DB / wants to keep current data), re-anchor the goal and continue.
Required ports (free these before starting)
| Port | Service | Listen evidence on macOS lsof |
|---|---|---|
| 3000 | Control Plane UI (Vite) | node … TCP *:hbci (LISTEN) |
| 3001 | Control Plane (Echo) | control-p … TCP *:redwood-broker (LISTEN) |
| 3040 | Compliance Proxy | complianc … TCP localhost:tomato-springs (LISTEN) |
| 3050 | AI Gateway | ai-gatewa … TCP *:gds_db (LISTEN) |
| 3060 | Nexus Hub | nexus-hub … TCP *:interserver (LISTEN) |
| 55532 | PostgreSQL (Docker) | com.docker … LISTEN |
| 6437 | Valkey (Docker) | com.docker … LISTEN |
| 4222 / 8222 | NATS (Docker) | com.docker … LISTEN |
macOS lsof prints IANA service names (hbci, redwood-broker, …) instead of port numbers — they are the same port, no aliasing.
Step 0 — Parallel-instance check (must run first)
A common first-run failure: the user has another local checkout running services that share this Docker Postgres. Symptoms: metric_ops_raw table fills with rows referencing thing IDs that don't exist (FK violation on prisma db push).
ps aux | grep -E "nexus-hub|control-plane|ai-gateway|compliance-proxy" | grep -v grep
lsof -i :3001 -i :3040 -i :3050 -i :3060 2>/dev/null | grep LISTEN
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 228 lines · 111 tokens per session scan A 9e9a8558c8f9
run-local is a skill published in the GitHub repository AlphaBitCore/nexus-gateway (23 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 111 tokens to every session and 3,096 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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