Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/andersonamaral2/Claude-Code-to-Deep-Agents-Skills-Converternpx agentmods add skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/andersonamaral2/claude-code-to-deep-agents-skills-converter/deep-agents-output-2.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 43 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 98 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 230 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 264 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 395 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 350 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 358 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 377 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- low Tool Misuse · line 377 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.02683 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01341 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00537 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00268 |
Grade B, and why
docker-compose-monitoring-stack scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo apt-get install docker-compose-plugin Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sf http://localhost:9090/-/healthy && echo " OK" || echo " FAILED" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 403 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Docker Compose Monitoring Stack
Deploys a complete monitoring stack with Prometheus, Grafana, and Node Exporter using Docker Compose.
Execution Context
This skill runs inside Deep Agents CLI (v0.0.34+). Available tools:
| Tool | Usage in this skill |
|---|---|
write_file |
Create docker-compose.yml, prometheus.yml, Grafana provisioning files, .env, .gitignore |
execute |
Run Docker Compose commands, verify services, run health checks |
read_file |
Read configuration files to verify content |
write_todos |
Track execution plan progress |
http_request |
Test service health endpoints |
Critical execution rules:
- Always start by creating the plan via
write_todos. - Create files one by one via
write_file— never try to generate everything at once. - Test each service via
executeimmediately after starting it. - Use
taskto delegate long or parallel subtasks to sub-agents.
Execution Plan (use with write_todos)
When receiving the request, run write_todos with:
- 1. Verify Docker and Docker Compose are installed
- 2. Check and set required environment variables
- 3. Create project directory structure
- 4. Create docker-compose.yml
- 5. Create Prometheus configuration
- 6. Create Grafana datasource provisioning
- 7. Create Grafana dashboard provisioning and dashboard JSON
- 8. Create .env and .gitignore files
- 9. Create AGENTS.md with stack documentation
- 10. Start the stack with Docker Compose
- 11. Run health checks on all services
When to Use
Use this skill when the user asks to:
- Set up monitoring or observability
- Deploy Prometheus and Grafana
- Create a monitoring stack
- Set up metrics collection
- Create a Grafana dashboard for infrastructure
Prerequisites Check
Before creating any files, use execute to verify:
# Check Docker
docker --version || { echo "ERROR: Docker not found. Install from https://docs.docker.com/get-docker/"; exit 1; }
# Check Docker Compose
docker compose version || { echo "ERROR: Docker Compose not found"; exit 1; }
# Check if Docker daemon is running
docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: Docker daemon is not running"; exit 1; }
echo "All prerequisites OK"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 403 lines · 27 tokens per session scan B f3e40f45e4a8
docker-compose-monitoring-stack is a skill published in the GitHub repository andersonamaral2/Claude-Code-to-Deep-Agents-Skills-Converter (57 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 2,683 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-docker-compose
Run the Omnigent server as a Docker compose stack (server + Postgres) on any Docker host — your laptop, a VPS, EC2 by hand, or as the base layer of any container-platform deploy. Invoke when the user wants to build the image, bring up the compose stack, debug the stack on a host they already have, or extend the stack…
compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.