Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to aveproject/ave. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aveproject/ave/main/.claude/skills/zoom-out/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/aveproject/aveWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/aveproject/ave/zoom-out)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aveproject/ave/zoom-out"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aveproject/ave/zoom-out/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/aveproject/ave/zoom-out"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/aveproject/ave/zoom-out.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00089 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00036 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00018 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00009 |
Grade A, and why
zoom-out scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
zoom-out — ave
Read before editing. Do not edit during zoom-out.
- Record, rule, fixture, or schema?
- ARCHITECTURE.md — the record/rule/fixture triangle
- If editing the schema: this affects ALL records and the scanner. Stop and coordinate. Schema changes are never solo edits.
- If editing a record: check what rules and fixtures reference its ave_id.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 10 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 025aa476ba3e
zoom-out is a skill published in the GitHub repository aveproject/ave (24 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 89 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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