Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add William2333ZZ/trustshell --skill redteam-an-agentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/William2333ZZ/trustshellWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/william2333zz/trustshell/redteam-an-agent)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/william2333zz/trustshell/redteam-an-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/william2333zz/trustshell/redteam-an-agent/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/william2333zz/trustshell/redteam-an-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/william2333zz/trustshell/redteam-an-agent.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00090 | $0.02060 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00824 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00412 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00206 |
Grade A, and why
redteam-an-agent scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Red-team an agent · the real process
This is the process a capable red-teamer actually follows against one specific agent. It is not a scanner and not a fixed payload list — the work is adaptive: you read the target's own code, form hypotheses about how it can be reached by an attacker, and settle each one with an exploit. The value is the credible verdict (what breaks, what holds, and why), not any single "gotcha."
Written from real engagements. Every rule below exists because skipping it produced a wrong conclusion — an over-claimed break, or a "vulnerability" that was really just local access.
Authorization & safety — read first
Follow every rule in ../README.md: authorized target only, disposable
environment only, never handle the target's real credentials (the owner configures provider keys;
you reference them, never see or print the value), harmless proof markers only, no destruction/
exfiltration/persistence, method-not-weapons, responsible disclosure. Otherwise stop.
Phase 1 — Recon THIS target (map it; assume nothing)
Read the target's own source. Do not assume "lightweight = weak" or "popular = safe." Map the attack surfaces and record each defense as a fact:
- Tool / command execution: what can it do (shell, file, network, browser, real-world actuators)? Is execution gated (human/LLM approval)? Sandboxed? Confined to a workspace? A regex deny-list? What are the defaults (a control that ships off is the finding).
- Memory / persistence: where does it write standing state (USER profile, memory files)? Is content curated automatically, or only on explicit user request? Any injection defense?
- Skill / plugin / MCP loading: is untrusted extension code trusted? Is the guard at install time only (so a locally-placed one is unscanned)?
- Channels / inbound: how does an external message enter, and where is the sender authorized? What is the default (deny-by-default, or open)? Output: a per-target map of candidate weak points. A candidate is a hypothesis, not a finding.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 117 lines · 90 tokens per session scan A fcd13dec92e3
redteam-an-agent is a skill published in the GitHub repository William2333ZZ/trustshell (1 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 90 tokens to every session and 2,060 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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