Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hashgraph-online/hol-guard --skill statusgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hashgraph-online/hol-guardWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hashgraph-online/hol-guard/status)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hashgraph-online/hol-guard/status"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hashgraph-online/hol-guard/status/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hashgraph-online/hol-guard/status"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hashgraph-online/hol-guard/status.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.00195 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00078 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00039 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00019 |
Grade A, and why
status scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Check HOL Guard status
Perform read-only checks first. Do not repair, install, reconnect, or change policy unless the user separately asks for that action.
-
Confirm the CLI exists:
command -v hol-guard -
If present, report the installed version and current protection state:
hol-guard --version hol-guard status -
Summarize only what the CLI proves. Distinguish active local protection from optional Guard Cloud connectivity.
-
If Guard reports degraded or missing Claude Code protection, suggest running
/hol-guard:setup. Do not claim that having this Claude plugin installed means runtime protection is active.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 27 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A b4befe4fb616
status is a skill published in the GitHub repository hashgraph-online/hol-guard (956 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 195 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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