Containerization Assist is an MCP server that helps create, inspect, and deploy Docker containers and Kubernetes applications. Developers use it for Dockerfile generation, image scanning, Kubernetes manifest creation, security checks, policy-based configuration, and deployment workflows.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Azure/containerization-assist --skill fix-dockerfilegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Azure/containerization-assistWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/azure/containerization-assist/fix-dockerfile)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/azure/containerization-assist/fix-dockerfile"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/azure/containerization-assist/fix-dockerfile/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/azure/containerization-assist/fix-dockerfile"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/azure/containerization-assist/fix-dockerfile.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 56 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 56 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 56 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 109 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 131 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- low Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.03477 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.01391 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00695 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00348 |
Grade B, and why
fix-dockerfile scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
| `avoid-sudo` | Drop `sudo ` prefix. If the action requires root, move it before the final `USER` directive. | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
| `optimize-package-install` | `RUN` line with `apt-get install` but NO `rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` in the same `RUN` | warning | Combine update + install + cleanup in one `RUN`. | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| `require-healthcheck` | Add a HEALTHCHECK matching the base image's available tools: `curl -fsS http://localhost:<port>/health \|\| exit 1` if curl is present; `wget --spider -q http://localhost:<port>/health \|\| exit How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 229 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Fix Dockerfile
Validate an existing Dockerfile against a fixed rule set, score it, and produce a fully remediated version. Deterministic — every rule below is a regex or a structural check, not a judgment call.
Inputs
| Field | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
dockerfile or path |
yes | Either the file contents OR an absolute path. If path is given, read it. |
environment |
optional | production (default) or development. Some rules downgrade to suggestions in dev. |
targetPlatform |
optional | linux/amd64 (default) or linux/arm64. Used only in the Next steps section. |
If neither is provided → ask the user for the Dockerfile path. STOP.
Procedure
Step 1 — Read the file
If path is given, read the file content. Reject if it doesn't contain at
least one FROM line (case-insensitive) — that's not a Dockerfile.
Step 2 — Run every rule
Apply each rule below in order. For each match, record an issue with
{ ruleId, category, severity, line, message }.
severity ∈ error (must fix) | warning (should fix) | info (nice to fix).
category ∈ security | performance | bestPractices.
When a rule says "scan lines", split the file on \n, trim each line, ignore
empty lines and lines starting with #.
Security rules (highest priority)
| ruleId | Pattern | Severity | Message |
|---|---|---|---|
block-root-user |
Any line matches ^USER\s+(root|0)\s*$ (case-insensitive multiline) |
error | Running as root is forbidden. Replace with a non-root user. |
no-root-user |
No USER line at all, OR final USER line argument is root/0 |
error | Container must declare a non-root USER instruction. |
block-secrets-in-env |
Any ENV or ARG line matches (?i)(PASSWORD|PASSWD|SECRET|TOKEN|API[_-]?KEY|PRIVATE[_-]?KEY|ACCESS[_-]?KEY|CREDENTIAL|DATABASE_URL|CONNECTION_STRING|REDIS_URL|MONGODB?_URI|_DSN)\b.*=\s*\S+ with a non-empty, non-placeholder value |
error | Hardcoded secret in ENV/ARG. Inject via runtime (Kubernetes Secret). |
no-secrets |
Same as above but covers RUN export FOO=… and RUN echo "FOO=…" shapes |
error | Hardcoded secret in RUN. |
avoid-sudo |
Any line matches (?i)\bsudo\b |
warning | Drop sudo; run the entire stage as the required user instead. |
avoid-apt-upgrade |
Any line matches (?i)apt-get\s+(upgrade|dist-upgrade) |
warning | Avoid apt-get upgrade; pin package versions. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 229 lines · 95 tokens per session scan B da8980890aaa
fix-dockerfile is a skill published in the GitHub repository Azure/containerization-assist (43 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 3,477 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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