Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skillsnpx agentmods add skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-responseWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-response)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-response/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills/supply-chain-attack-response.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 299 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 300 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 45 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 222 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 442 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 566 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 701 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.06160 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.03080 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.01232 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00616 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-attack-response scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -u admin:$NEXUS_PASSWORD -X PUT \ Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
| xargs grep -l "subprocess\|os.system\|exec(\|eval(" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 840 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Attack Response
Software supply chain attacks target the dependencies, build systems, and distribution channels that developers trust implicitly. When a package on PyPI, npm, or crates.io is compromised, every downstream consumer inherits the malicious payload. This skill provides detection techniques, emergency response playbooks, and hardening strategies to protect your software supply chain end to end.
1. When to Use This Skill
Invoke this skill when any of the following apply:
- A dependency you consume has been flagged as compromised (e.g., advisories on OSV.dev, GitHub Advisory Database, or vendor disclosure).
- You observe suspicious behavior from a dependency: unexpected network calls, file system writes outside its scope, or new post-install scripts.
- You are conducting a periodic supply chain security audit.
- A CI/CD pipeline is behaving unexpectedly after a dependency update.
- You are onboarding a new third-party dependency and want to verify its provenance.
- You need to respond to an incident such as a typosquatted package or registry account takeover.
- You are implementing SLSA compliance or need to generate build provenance.
2. Detection
2.1 npm Audit
# Full audit of installed packages
npm audit
# JSON output for programmatic processing
npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | select(.value.severity == "critical")'
# Fix automatically where possible
npm audit fix
# Check for known malicious packages via Socket.dev CLI
npx socket scan --package-lock package-lock.json
2.2 pip Audit
# Install pip-audit (maintained by Google/OSSF)
pip install pip-audit
# Audit current environment against OSV.dev
pip-audit
# Audit a requirements file directly
pip-audit -r requirements.txt --output json
# Check for typosquatting with bandersnatch or custom script
pip-audit --strict --desc on
2.3 Cargo Audit
# Install cargo-audit
cargo install cargo-audit
# Run audit against RustSec Advisory Database
cargo audit
# JSON output for CI integration
cargo audit --json
# Check for yanked crates
cargo audit --deny yanked
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 840 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 3c6a80a76e33
supply-chain-attack-response is a skill published in the GitHub repository BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills (1,067 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 6,160 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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