Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboard --skill security-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboardWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/blackbelttechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/security-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/blackbelttechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/blackbelttechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/security-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/blackbelttechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/blackbelttechnology/pi-agent-dashboard/security-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 3 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 218 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 331 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 333 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 337 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 334 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 338 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 305 Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.Fix: Restrict tool access to only the tools required for the skill's stated purpose. Use an explicit allowlist rather than granting blanket access.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00074 | $0.04475 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.02237 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00895 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00447 |
Grade B, and why
security-hardening scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
The `range() !== 'unicast'` check covers loopback, link-local `169.254.169.254` (cloud metadata, the #1 SSRF target), private, and unique-local ranges across IPv4 and IPv6. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
- **Be wary of `postinstall` scripts** in unfamiliar packages — they run arbitrary code at install time. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
await fetch(req.body.webhookUrl); Copies of this mod
8 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- security-and-hardening — 92% identical, 4 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 92% identical, 4 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 92% identical, 4 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 92% identical, 4 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 84% identical, 45 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 84% identical, 40 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 84% identical, 40 lines differ
- security-and-hardening — 84% identical, 40 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 462 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security and Hardening
Overview
Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.
When to Use
- Building anything that accepts user input
- Implementing authentication or authorization
- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
- Integrating with external APIs or services
- Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
- Handling payment or PII data
Process: Threat Model First
Controls bolted on without a threat model are guesses. Before hardening, spend five minutes thinking like an attacker:
- Map the trust boundaries. Where does untrusted data cross into your system? HTTP requests, form fields, file uploads, webhooks, third-party APIs, message queues, and LLM output. Every boundary is attack surface.
- Name the assets. What's worth stealing or breaking? Credentials, PII, payment data, admin actions, money movement.
- Run STRIDE over each boundary — a quick lens, not a ceremony:
| Threat | Ask | Typical mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can someone impersonate a user/service? | Authentication, signature verification |
| Tampering | Can data be altered in transit or at rest? | Integrity checks, parameterized queries, HTTPS |
| Repudiation | Can an action be denied later? | Audit logging of security events |
| Information disclosure | Can data leak? | Encryption, field allowlists, generic errors |
| Denial of service | Can it be overwhelmed? | Rate limiting, input size caps, timeouts |
| Elevation of privilege | Can a user gain rights they shouldn't? | Authorization checks, least privilege |
- Write abuse cases next to use cases. For each feature, ask "how would I misuse this?" — then make that your first test.
If you can't name the trust boundaries for a feature, you're not ready to secure it. This is OWASP A04: Insecure Design — most breaches begin in design, not code.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 462 lines · 74 tokens per session scan B 74a614b89716
security-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboard (279 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 4,475 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, unrestricted tool access, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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goga-define-challenge
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goga-define-experience
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goga-review-plan
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