Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills --skill container-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/container-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 55 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 55 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 118 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 55 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 38 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 42 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00127 | $0.02508 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00063 | $0.01254 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.00502 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00251 |
Grade A, and why
container-audit scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- No `chmod 4755` SUID binaries in the final image Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- `ADD <url>` follows redirects and disables checksum verification — prefer `RUN curl ... && sha256sum -c` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 195 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Audit — Docker & Kubernetes Security Review
Audit container images, Dockerfiles, Helm charts, Kustomize overlays, and Kubernetes manifests for misconfiguration, excessive privilege, exposed secrets, and runtime security gaps. Distinct from cloud-audit (cloud-provider IAM and managed services) and dependency-audit (package CVEs in the application). This skill is the container/orchestration layer between them.
Scope the Audit
- Inventory the surface — Dockerfiles, base images, registries, Helm charts, K8s manifests, Kustomize overlays, CI build pipelines that produce images
- Identify the runtime — vanilla K8s, EKS, GKE, AKS, OpenShift, ECS Fargate, Cloud Run, Fly.io
- Identify the network model — service mesh, ingress controller, default-deny vs default-allow
- Identify the secret model — K8s Secrets (base64-only), External Secrets Operator, sealed-secrets, Vault, Doppler
Audit Checklist — Dockerfile
Base image & supply chain
- Pinned by digest, not tag —
FROM node:20@sha256:abc...notFROM node:20(which can move) - Distroless / minimal where possible —
gcr.io/distroless/nodejs20,alpine(be aware of musl quirks),chainguard/* - Not using
:latest— non-reproducible builds - Multi-stage builds discard build-time tooling —
FROM build AS builder→FROM runtimefinal stage - Grep for:
FROM .*:latest,FROM .*:[0-9]+$(tag without digest)
Build-time exposure
- Secrets passed via
--build-argend up in image layers visible to anyone who pulls the image — use BuildKit secrets (--mount=type=secret) or runtime env vars instead COPY . .ships everything in the build context —.dockerignoreshould exclude.git,.env,node_modules,*.pem,.aws/,.ssh/ADD <url>follows redirects and disables checksum verification — preferRUN curl ... && sha256sum -c- Grep for:
ARG .*KEY,ARG .*TOKEN,ARG .*SECRET,ENV .*=.*[A-Za-z0-9]{32,},ADD http
Runtime posture
- Non-root user —
USER 1001(or any non-zero UID) beforeCMD - No
chmod 4755SUID binaries in the final image - No unnecessary shells / package managers in the final stage — distroless / FROM scratch is the strong default
HEALTHCHECKdefined so orchestrator can detect unhealthy containers- Read-only root filesystem at runtime (set via K8s; verify nothing in the image writes outside
/tmpor a declared volume) - Grep for:
USER root(or absence of anyUSERdirective),chmod 4755,apt-get install.*sudo
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 195 lines · 127 tokens per session scan A 9f24eeca771d
container-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills (387 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 127 tokens to every session and 2,508 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-docker-compose
Run the Omnigent server as a Docker compose stack (server + Postgres) on any Docker host — your laptop, a VPS, EC2 by hand, or as the base layer of any container-platform deploy. Invoke when the user wants to build the image, bring up the compose stack, debug the stack on a host they already have, or extend the stack…
compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.