Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cinience/alicloud-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-clusterWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-cluster)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-cluster"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-cluster/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-cluster"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/cinience/alicloud-skills/alicloud-acs-cluster.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 3 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 45 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 70 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 102 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 48 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 49 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 51 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00083 | $0.01562 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.00781 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00312 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00156 |
Grade A, and why
alicloud-acs-cluster scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 114 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Manage ACS clusters
Use the bundled OpenAPI client for the ACS cluster lifecycle. Use $aliyun-vpc-manage first when the VPC and VSwitches do not exist, and use $alicloud-acs-agent-sandbox after the cluster is ready.
Workflow
-
Read references/cluster-lifecycle.md before creating or deleting a cluster.
-
Set
ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID,ALIBABACLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET, and optionallyALIBABACLOUD_SECURITY_TOKEN. SetALIBABACLOUD_REGION_ID=cn-hangzhoufor Hangzhou. -
Before creating the network, confirm that the Alibaba Cloud account has already authorized both CSI service roles:
AliyunCSManagedCsiPluginRolewithAliyunCSManagedCsiPluginRolePolicyAliyunCSManagedCsiProvisionerRolewithAliyunCSManagedCsiProvisionerRolePolicy
These are account-level, one-time authorizations. If the execution identity cannot call
ram:GetRole, have the Alibaba Cloud account owner or a RAM administrator complete the official authorization pages. Container Service permissions alone cannot create these roles. -
Install the official SDK:
python3 -m pip install "alibabacloud-cs20151215==7.0.4" "alibabacloud-tea-openapi"
- Preview the exact create request without credentials or mutation:
python3 skills/compute/acs/alicloud-acs-cluster/scripts/acs_cluster.py create \
--region cn-hangzhou \
--name <cluster-name> \
--vpc-id <vpc-id> \
--vswitch-id <vswitch-a> \
--vswitch-id <vswitch-b> \
--service-cidr 172.21.0.0/20 \
--snat --public-api --enterprise-security-group --deletion-protection \
--addon managed-coredns \
--addon alb-ingress-controller \
--dry-run
--dry-run is a local request-shape preview. It does not call Alibaba Cloud and therefore cannot validate service-role authorization, quota, capacity, or addon availability.
6. Run the same command without --dry-run after confirming the cost and public API exposure. Save the result under output/alicloud-acs-cluster/.
7. Require state=running, profile=Acs, the expected VPC/VSwitches, healthy virtual nodes, managed-coredns addon active, and a kube-dns Service before installing Agent Sandbox. Explicit addon lists can result in a cluster without CoreDNS; base Pods may run while Agent Identity storage later fails DNS.
8. Request a short-lived KubeConfig and protect it as a secret:
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 114 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A 49780a77e65a
alicloud-acs-cluster is a skill published in the GitHub repository cinience/alicloud-skills (396 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 83 tokens to every session and 1,562 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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