Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to DanielPodolsky/ownyourcode. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DanielPodolsky/ownyourcode/main/.claude/skills/fundamentals/security/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/DanielPodolsky/ownyourcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielpodolsky/ownyourcode/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielpodolsky/ownyourcode/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/danielpodolsky/ownyourcode/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielpodolsky/ownyourcode/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/danielpodolsky/ownyourcode/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Anti-Refusal · line 98 Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.01284 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00514 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00257 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
security-fundamentals scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 167 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Fundamentals Review
"Security is not a feature. It's a foundation. Build on sand, and the house falls."
When to Apply
Activate this skill when reviewing:
- Authentication/login flows
- Authorization checks
- User input handling
- Database queries
- File uploads
- API endpoints
- Data exposure in responses
Review Checklist
Input Validation (NEVER Trust the Client)
- All inputs validated: Is every user input checked before use?
- Server-side validation: Is validation done on the server, not just client?
- Type checking: Are expected types enforced?
- Length limits: Are string lengths bounded?
- Whitelist over blacklist: Are allowed values explicitly defined?
Authentication
- Password hashing: Are passwords hashed (bcrypt, argon2), not encrypted?
- No plaintext secrets: Are secrets in env vars, not code?
- Token expiry: Do JWTs/sessions have reasonable expiration?
- Secure transmission: Is HTTPS enforced?
Authorization
- Ownership checks: Can users only access THEIR data?
- Role verification: Are admin routes protected by role checks?
- No client-side auth: Is authorization enforced server-side?
Data Exposure
- Minimal response: Does the API return only necessary fields?
- No sensitive data in URLs: Are tokens/IDs not in query strings?
- No sensitive data in logs: Are passwords/tokens excluded from logs?
OWASP Top 10 Quick Check
1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, Command)
❌ db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`);
✅ db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [userId]);
2. Broken Authentication
❌ if (req.headers.admin === 'true') { /* allow admin */ }
✅ const user = await verifyToken(req.headers.authorization);
if (user.role !== 'admin') throw new ForbiddenError();
3. Sensitive Data Exposure
❌ res.json({ user: { ...user, password, ssn } });
✅ res.json({ user: { id: user.id, name: user.name } });
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 167 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 505c12ae047d
security-fundamentals is a skill published in the GitHub repository DanielPodolsky/ownyourcode (292 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 1,284 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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