Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add danielvm-git/bigpowers --skill harden-vpsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/danielvm-git/bigpowersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielvm-git/bigpowers/harden-vps)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielvm-git/bigpowers/harden-vps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/danielvm-git/bigpowers/harden-vps/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/danielvm-git/bigpowers/harden-vps"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/danielvm-git/bigpowers/harden-vps.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 76 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 82 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 151 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 208 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 71 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 102 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 216 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 230 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.03065 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00040 | $0.01226 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00613 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00307 |
Grade A, and why
harden-vps scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
TOKEN=$(curl -s -d "client_id=$CONTABO_CLIENT_ID" \ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sL "$(curl -sL https://api.github.com/repos/contabo/cntb/releases/latest \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 292 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Harden VPS
Three-layer production hardening for a self-hosted app on any VPS. Each layer independently verifiable. Apply OS first (firewall blocks attacks immediately), then your application (alerts + backups), then your VPS provider (snapshots). See REFERENCE.md for full script bodies, systemd unit template, and gotchas.
Quick start
SSH as root into the VPS. Find credentials in the your VPS provider Customer Control Panel.
HARD GATE — Run
ufw statusfirst. No firewall = layer 1 takes priority over everything.
Layer 1 — Ubuntu OS
# UFW
ufw default deny incoming && ufw default allow outgoing
ufw allow 22/tcp && ufw allow 80/tcp && ufw allow 443/tcp && ufw enable
# → verify: ufw status | grep -q active
# fail2ban
apt install -y fail2ban
# Configure /etc/fail2ban/jail.local: sshd, maxretry=3, bantime=3600, findtime=600
systemctl restart fail2ban
# → verify: fail2ban-client status sshd
# unattended-upgrades
apt install -y unattended-upgrades && dpkg-reconfigure -plow unattended-upgrades
# → verify: systemctl is-active unattended-upgrades | grep -q active
# SSH: PermitRootLogin no, PasswordAuthentication no, PubkeyAuthentication yes
# → verify: sshd -T | grep -E 'permitrootlogin no|passwordauthentication no'
# Deploy healthcheck.sh → /opt/your-app/scripts/healthcheck.sh
# Crontab: */5 * * * * /opt/your-app/scripts/healthcheck.sh
Layer 2 — applicationlication
# systemd: User=your-app, NoNewPrivileges=yes, ProtectSystem=full,
# ProtectKernelTunables=yes, ProtectKernelModules=yes,
# ProtectControlGroups=yes, RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6,
# RestrictRealtime=yes, PrivateTmp=yes, LimitNOFILE=65536
# → verify: systemctl show your-app -p NoNewPrivileges -p ProtectSystem -p User
# Alerts (your application requires auth; insert via SQLite)
sqlite3 /opt/your-app/data/your-app.db "
INSERT INTO monitoring_alerts (id,name,metric,threshold,operator,enabled,duration_seconds)
VALUES ('a1','Disk >80%','disk_used_percent',80,'gt',1,300);
INSERT INTO monitoring_alerts (id,name,metric,threshold,operator,enabled,duration_seconds)
VALUES ('a2','CPU >90%','cpu_percent',90,'gt',1,60);
INSERT INTO monitoring_alerts (id,name,metric,threshold,operator,enabled,duration_seconds)
VALUES ('a3','RAM >85%','mem_used_percent',85,'gt',1,120);
"
systemctl restart your-app
# Backup crontab (root):
# 0 2 * * * cp /opt/your-app/data/your-app.db /backup/your-app-$(date +\%Y\%m\%d).db
# 0 3 * * * find /backup/ -name "your-app-*.db" -mtime +90 -delete
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 292 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A f7f584e16eaf
harden-vps is a skill published in the GitHub repository danielvm-git/bigpowers (273 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 3,065 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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