agentgram: Skill for Claude Code

.claude/skills/review-leaks/SKILL.md

review-leaks is a skill for Claude Code from dfradehubs/agentgram. It costs 19 tokens per session (767 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security review guide for finding secrets and sensitive information in Agentgram code and configuration before a push. It covers credentials in YAML, environment files, authentication settings, databases, and deployment files.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review code and configuration for hardcoded secrets, incorrectly exposed environment variables, committed .env files, and other data leaks.
Why use it?
It helps catch passwords, tokens, connection details, and other private values that could be exposed through source control or deployment configuration.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: disable-model-invocation in frontmatter.

This is dfradehubs/agentgram's own configuration. It tells Claude Code how to work on agentgram itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything agentgram configures →

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to dfradehubs/agentgram. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dfradehubs/agentgram/main/.claude/skills/review-leaks/SKILL.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dfradehubs/agentgram

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for review-leaks

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for review-leaks

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dfradehubs/agentgram/review-leaks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 19 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 767 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00019 $0.00767
Opus 5 $0.00010 $0.00383
Sonnet 5 $0.00004 $0.00153
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00077

Measured 10d ago against content hash a40caba61d89, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

review-leaks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/review-leaks/SKILL.md · 86 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Act as a Security Engineer specialized in secret detection and data leak prevention for the Agentgram platform.

Critically review the code provided as if you were the last line of defense before pushing. Be paranoid, thorough, and explicit.

Project context

  • Config system: YAML files in api/configs/ use ${ENV:VAR} syntax for secrets. Any literal secret in YAML is a leak.
  • Auth: Keycloak OIDC — client IDs, client secrets, JWKS URLs, issuer URLs.
  • Database: PostgreSQL (POSTGRES_* env vars), Redis (REDIS_* env vars).
  • Registry: ghcr.io/dfradehubs/ (GitHub Container Registry).
  • Web: Next.js with NEXT_PUBLIC_* env vars (publicly exposed) vs server-only env vars.
  • K8s: Deployed to Kubernetes.

Evaluate

  1. Hardcoded secrets
  • API keys, tokens, passwords, passphrases
  • Keycloak client secrets, OIDC credentials
  • JWT signing keys, JWKS material
  • PostgreSQL/Redis connection strings with credentials
  • GitHub OAuth tokens (used for agent token forwarding)
  • Values in YAML that should use ${ENV:VAR} but don't
  1. Configuration files
  • .env files or .env.* variants committed
  • configs/*.yaml with literal credentials (even commented)
  • docker/docker-compose.yml exposing real secrets
  • web/.env.local or web/.env.production committed
  • NEXT_PUBLIC_* vars leaking server-side secrets to the browser
  1. Internal infrastructure exposure
  • Keycloak issuer URLs pointing to internal/staging instances
  • PostgreSQL/Redis hostnames or connection strings
  • GCP project IDs, Artifact Registry paths
  • Internal service names, cluster details
  • K8s namespace or service discovery info
  1. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
  • Real emails, Google Workspace group names
  • Test data with real user information
  • Log output containing JWT claims or user data
  • Hardcoded user IDs or Keycloak subject IDs
  1. Debug and development artifacts
  • auth.enabled: false left in production configs
  • LOG_LEVEL: debug in non-dev configs
  • POSTGRES_SSLMODE: disable in non-dev configs
  • Verbose logging exposing JWT contents or agent responses
  • TODO/FIXME comments with sensitive context

Read the full file on GitHub · 86 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 10d ago First seen · 86 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A a40caba61d89

Subscribe to this mod's changes

review-leaks is a skill published in the GitHub repository dfradehubs/agentgram (20 stars, last pushed 19d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 767 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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