Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add divinevideo/divine-mobile --skill gorse-runasnonroot-failuregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/divinevideo/divine-mobileWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/divinevideo/divine-mobile/gorse-runasnonroot-failure)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/divinevideo/divine-mobile/gorse-runasnonroot-failure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/divinevideo/divine-mobile/gorse-runasnonroot-failure/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/divinevideo/divine-mobile/gorse-runasnonroot-failure"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/divinevideo/divine-mobile/gorse-runasnonroot-failure.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 8 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 31 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 72 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00110 | $0.00722 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00055 | $0.00361 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00144 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00072 |
Grade A, and why
gorse-runasnonroot-failure scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 78 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Gorse runAsNonRoot Container Failure
Problem
Gorse recommendation engine containers (master, server, worker) crash immediately on
startup when running with Kubernetes runAsNonRoot: true and a custom UID like 65532.
Context / Trigger Conditions
- Gorse pods show
CrashLoopBackOfforErrorstatus - Pod logs show:
{"level":"fatal","ts":...,"caller":"model/built_in.go:95","msg":"failed to get user directory","error":"user: unknown userid 65532"} - Deployment has
securityContext.runAsNonRoot: trueandrunAsUser: 65532 - Using official gorse images (
zhenghaoz/gorse-master,zhenghaoz/gorse-server,zhenghaoz/gorse-worker)
Root Cause
The gorse codebase calls Go's os.UserHomeDir() during initialization in model/built_in.go.
This function requires the running UID to have an entry in /etc/passwd. When running as
a non-root user that doesn't exist in the container's passwd file, the lookup fails.
Solution
Remove the runAsNonRoot and runAsUser constraints from the pod security context:
# Before (broken)
spec:
template:
spec:
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 65532
fsGroup: 65532
# After (working)
spec:
template:
spec:
securityContext:
fsGroup: 1000
Apply to all gorse deployments:
deployment-master.yamldeployment-server.yamldeployment-worker.yamlinit-db-job.yaml(if using init job)
Verification
After updating the security context:
- Delete existing crashing pods:
kubectl delete pods -l app.kubernetes.io/name=gorse -n gorse - Wait for new pods to start
- Check logs:
kubectl logs -l app=gorse-master -n gorse - Verify master shows connection to data store and cache store
Notes
- This is a limitation of the official gorse images, not a Kubernetes issue
- The gorse project may fix this in future versions by not requiring home directory
- If security policy requires non-root, you would need to build custom gorse images
with proper
/etc/passwdentries for the desired UID - Redis Stack images used for gorse cache have the same issue with UID 65532
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 78 lines · 110 tokens per session scan A e16f4e619a02
gorse-runasnonroot-failure is a skill published in the GitHub repository divinevideo/divine-mobile (265 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MPL-2.0. It adds 110 tokens to every session and 722 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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