Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add duc01226/EasyPlatform --skill why-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/duc01226/EasyPlatformWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/why-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/why-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/why-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/why-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duc01226/easyplatform/why-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 61 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Prompt Injection · line 18 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 55 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 541 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 557 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 585 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 604 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 623 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 637 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 684 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 767 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 793 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 969 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1035 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1042 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1050 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1108 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Agent Snooping · line 1126 Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
- high Prompt Injection · line 1134 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1149 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1205 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.33014 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.16507 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.06603 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.03301 |
Grade A, and why
why-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,354 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Codex compatibility note:
- Invoke repository skills with
$skill-namein Codex; this mirrored copy rewrites legacy Claude/skill-namereferences.- Task tracker mandate: BEFORE executing any workflow or skill step, create/update task tracking for all steps and keep it synchronized as progress changes.
- User-question prompts mean to ask the user directly in Codex.
- Ignore Claude-specific mode-switch instructions when they appear.
- Strict execution contract: when a user explicitly invokes a skill, execute that skill protocol as written.
- Subagent authorization: when a skill is user-invoked or AI-detected and its protocol requires subagents, that skill activation authorizes use of the required
spawn_agentsubagent(s) for that task.- Do not skip, reorder, or merge protocol steps unless the user explicitly approves the deviation first.
- For workflow skills, execute each listed child-skill step explicitly and report step-by-step evidence.
- If a required step/tool cannot run in this environment, stop and ask the user before adapting.
Codex Project-Reference Loading (No Hooks)
Codex uses static project-reference loading instead of runtime-injected project docs. When coding, planning, debugging, testing, or reviewing, open project docs explicitly using this routing.
Always read:
docs/project-config.json(project-specific paths, commands, modules, and workflow/test settings)docs/project-reference/docs-index-reference.md(routes to the fulldocs/project-reference/*catalog)docs/project-reference/lessons.md(always-on guardrails and anti-patterns)
Missing/stale context route: If docs/project-config.json, the docs index, lessons.md, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, or any task-required reference doc is missing or stale, auto-run $project-init or the narrow setup route ($project-config, $docs-init, $scan-all, $scan --target=<key>, $claude-md-init) before ordinary project-specific work. If Codex mirrors or AGENTS.md are missing/stale, ask the user to run $sync-codex; do not auto-run it.
Situation-based docs:
- Project structure/architecture/tech-stack/deployment/setup (any layer — backend, frontend, or infra):
project-structure-reference.md - Backend/CQRS/API/domain/entity changes:
backend-patterns-reference.md,domain-entities-reference.md - Frontend/UI/styling/design-system:
frontend-patterns-reference.md,scss-styling-guide.md,design-system/README.md - Spec authoring,
docs/specs/pathing, or TC format:feature-spec-reference.md,spec-system-reference.md,spec-principles.md - Behavior/public-contract changes or spec-test-code sync:
workflow-spec-test-code-cycle-reference.mdplus the spec docs above - Derived spec indexes/ERDs/reimplementation guides:
spec-system-reference.mdand source Feature Specs underdocs/specs/ - Integration test implementation/review:
integration-test-reference.md - E2E test implementation/review:
e2e-test-reference.md - Code review/audit work:
code-review-rules.mdplus domain docs above based on changed files
Do not read all docs blindly. Start from docs-index-reference.md, then open only relevant files for the task.
[GOAL REMINDER — MUST ATTENTION CRITICAL]
Ensure every review target is reasonable, correct, proof-backed, and best-practice aligned. ALWAYS ASK THE 3 TRADE-OFF QUESTIONS (every decision AND every recommendation you make): (1) is there any trade-off? — name what it sacrifices; "none" is an unfinished analysis, not an answer; (2) is it worth it? — gain vs cost, who pays, when → WORTH IT / NOT WORTH IT / UNCLEAR; (3) is the trade-off material enough to confirm with the user? — irreversible, cost shifted to someone else, one quality attribute traded for another, boundary crossed, high-consequence path, or UNCLEAR → STOP and confirm by asking the user directly BEFORE the verdict. NEVER resolve a material trade-off silently. — why: naming a benefit without its price is an endorsement, not a review, and a one-way door is the user's call to walk through, never yours. MANDATORY SECOND PASS (full mode): whenever Round 1 produces ANY finding, you MUST call
$why-review --validate-findingsa SECOND time on those findings to confirm each is correct and reasonable BEFORE handoff. NEVER skip it; NEVER suppress, demote, or under-report findings to dodge it. The self-recursive review loop bound as the first full-mode action — the protocol loop primarily (host-independent), plus a/goalStop-hook gate WHEN available — BLOCKS stopping until findings are validated. — why: an unvalidated finding is an unproven claim, and a second self-review catches the misreads and inflation Round 1 rationalized.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 1,354 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A 39c3a573391a
why-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository duc01226/EasyPlatform (9 stars, last pushed 19d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 33,014 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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