CyberStrikeAI is a security operations workspace that turns natural-language plans into governed, auditable actions while recording evidence and results for later reuse. Authorized security teams use it to manage agents, tools, vulnerabilities, knowledge, and attack-chain analysis. Catalogue add-ons provide agent and skill workflows for working with the platform.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI --skill component-vuln-intelgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAIWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/component-vuln-intel)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/component-vuln-intel"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/component-vuln-intel/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/component-vuln-intel"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/component-vuln-intel.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Supply Chain · line 17 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 37 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 38 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 39 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 40 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- low Supply Chain · line 37 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- low Supply Chain · line 38 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- low Supply Chain · line 39 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- low Supply Chain · line 40 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.01444 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00722 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00289 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00144 |
Grade B, and why
component-vuln-intel scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
terminal: curl -s "https://cve.circl.lu/api/search/{C}/{V}" | python3 -c "import sys,json;[print(x['id'],x.get('summary','')[:80]) for x in json.load(sys.stdin)[:10]]" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
terminal: curl -s "https://cve.circl.lu/api/search/{C}/{V}" | python3 -c "import sys,json;[print(x['id'],x.get('summary','')[:80]) for x in json.load(sys.stdin)[:10]]" What it actually says
联网情报收集（识别组件→立即全网搜；结果=线索/tentative，验证前不是 confirmed Fact）
🔴一识别出框架/组件/版本 → 必须停本地扫描立即联网(不搜就利用=盲打=违反铁律)。
🔴以下序列全部执行(不是选做),用{C}=组件名 {V}=版本替换。每步都用browser_navigate或terminal实际访问:
1.CVE漏洞库(必做,找已知漏洞):
terminal: searchsploit {C} {V}
terminal: curl -s "https://cve.circl.lu/api/search/{C}/{V}" | python3 -c "import sys,json;[print(x['id'],x.get('summary','')[:80]) for x in json.load(sys.stdin)[:10]]"
browser_navigate: https://github.com/advisories?query={C}+{V}
browser_navigate: https://www.cvedetails.com/google-search-results.php?q={C}+{V}&sa=Search
2.搜索引擎(至少执行3个,找漏洞分析+PoC):
browser_navigate: https://www.google.com/search?q={C}+{V}+exploit+PoC+RCE+site:github.com
browser_navigate: https://www.google.com/search?q={C}+{V}+漏洞+利用+复现
browser_navigate: https://www.baidu.com/s?wd={C}+{V}+漏洞+利用+poc+getshell
browser_navigate: https://www.bing.com/search?q={C}+{V}+CVE+exploit+poc
browser_navigate: https://duckduckgo.com/?q={C}+{V}+vulnerability+exploit
3.中文安全社区(必做,中文首发多且深度分析好):
browser_navigate: https://xz.aliyun.com/search?keyword={C}+漏洞
browser_navigate: https://www.seebug.org/search/?keywords={C}
browser_navigate: https://paper.seebug.org/search/?keyword={C}
browser_navigate: https://www.freebuf.com/search?search={C}+{V}
browser_navigate: https://ti.qianxin.com/vulnerability?keyword={C}
browser_navigate: https://www.anquanke.com/search?s={C}
4.GitHub搜PoC/exploit代码(必做,最直接拿利用代码):
terminal: curl -s "https://api.github.com/search/repositories?q={C}+{V}+exploit+OR+poc+OR+CVE&sort=updated&per_page=10" | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);[print(x['full_name'],x['html_url'],x.get('description','')[:60]) for x in d.get('items',[])]"
terminal: curl -s "https://api.github.com/search/code?q={C}+RCE+OR+shell+OR+exploit+language:python&per_page=5" | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);[print(x['html_url']) for x in d.get('items',[])]"
terminal: curl -s "https://api.github.com/search/repositories?q={C}+CVE&sort=stars&per_page=5" | python3 -c "import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);[print(x['full_name'],x['stargazers_count'],'★',x.get('description','')[:50]) for x in d.get('items',[])]"
找到仓库后: curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/readme" | python3 -c "import sys,json,base64;print(base64.b64decode(json.load(sys.stdin)['content']).decode())"
5.资产引擎(找同类目标/暴露面):
browser_navigate: https://fofa.info/result?qbase64=$(echo -n 'app="{C}"' | base64)
browser_navigate: https://www.shodan.io/search?query={C}+{V}
browser_navigate: https://www.zoomeye.org/searchResult?q={C}
browser_navigate: https://search.censys.io/search?resource=hosts&q=services.software.product:{C}
6.即时情报(最新0day/在野利用):
browser_navigate: https://x.com/search?q={C}+CVE+OR+0day+OR+exploit&f=live
browser_navigate: https://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/search/?q={C}&sort=new&t=month
browser_navigate: https://www.exploit-db.com/search?q={C}
7.扩展链(必做): 搜完{C}后,提取其依赖清单(package.json/pom.xml/requirements.txt/go.mod)→对每个依赖重复1-6
🔴搜索受阻处理序列(碰到403/验证码/空结果/超时→按序执行不放弃):
①换UA: curl -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" "{URL}"
②Jina读取器: browser_navigate: https://r.jina.ai/{原始URL}
③Google缓存: browser_navigate: https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:{域名}+{关键词}
④Archive: browser_navigate: https://web.archive.org/web/{URL}
⑤GitHub API替代(GitHub页面拦但API不拦): 用上面第4步的curl命令
⑥换引擎: Google拦→执行Bing/DuckDuckGo/百度; 百度拦→执行Google/Bing
⑦走代理: 按 `proxy-tool-bootstrap` 序列获取SOCKS5代理后重试
全部受阻仍无结果→写负Fact"已搜{C} {V}全渠道无公开漏洞"→转 `zero-day-discovery`
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 66 lines · 68 tokens per session scan B d00539c4c234
component-vuln-intel is a skill published in the GitHub repository Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI (6,410 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,444 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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