Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/eddiebelaval/squirenpx agentmods add skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-managerWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-manager)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-manager"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-manager/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-manager"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/eddiebelaval/squire/config-manager.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 15 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 3 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 57 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 61 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 108 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 396 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 409 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 424 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 109 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 410 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 122 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 132 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 431 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 66 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 123 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 274 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.03841 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.01920 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00768 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00384 |
Grade A, and why
config-manager scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 679 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Configuration Manager Skill
Core Workflows
Workflow 1: Primary Action
- Analyze the input and context
- Validate prerequisites are met
- Execute the core operation
- Verify the output meets expectations
- Report results
Overview
This skill helps you design and implement robust configuration management for applications. Covers environment variables, config files, secrets management, validation, type safety, and multi-environment deployments.
Configuration Philosophy
Twelve-Factor App Principles
- Store config in the environment: Separate config from code
- Strict separation: Config that varies between deploys should be in env vars
- No secrets in code: Ever. Period.
Configuration Hierarchy
Priority (highest to lowest):
1. Command-line arguments
2. Environment variables
3. Environment-specific config files (.env.local)
4. Default config files (.env)
5. Application defaults in code
What Goes Where
- Environment Variables: API keys, database URLs, feature flags
- Config Files: Non-sensitive defaults, complex structures
- Secrets Manager: Production credentials, API tokens
- Code: Application logic, never secrets
Environment Variables
.env File Structure
# .env.example - Commit this file as documentation
# Copy to .env and fill in values
# ===================
# Application
# ===================
NODE_ENV=development
PORT=3000
APP_URL=http://localhost:3000
# ===================
# Database
# ===================
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:password@localhost:5432/mydb
DATABASE_POOL_SIZE=10
# ===================
# Authentication
# ===================
# Get from Supabase Dashboard > Settings > API
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL=https://xxx.supabase.co
NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=your-anon-key
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=your-service-role-key
# ===================
# External Services
# ===================
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_test_xxx
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=whsec_xxx
NEXT_PUBLIC_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=pk_test_xxx
# ===================
# Email
# ===================
RESEND_API_KEY=re_xxx
[email protected]
# ===================
# Feature Flags
# ===================
ENABLE_ANALYTICS=true
ENABLE_BETA_FEATURES=false
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 679 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 22d3f808fa76
config-manager is a skill published in the GitHub repository eddiebelaval/squire (21 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 3,841 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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