Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to egregore-labs/egregore. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/egregore-labs/egregore/main/.claude/skills/delete-user/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/egregore-labs/egregoreWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/delete-user)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/delete-user"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/delete-user/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/delete-user"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/egregore-labs/egregore/delete-user.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 64 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.01175 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00470 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00235 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00118 |
Grade A, and why
delete-user scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 24d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Remove a member from this Egregore. Revokes access across GitHub, Supabase, and Neo4j.
When to invoke
User says: "remove user", "delete user", "kick", "revoke access", "remove member", "remove them", "delete member"
Not this: invite someone → /invite · view members → /dashboard
Arguments: $ARGUMENTS (Required: GitHub username of the person to remove)
Execution rules
CRITICAL: Suppress raw output. Save the API response to a file, read it with jq, and only show formatted status lines to the user.
CRITICAL: Never expose credentials in tool output. All credential handling happens inside bin/api-call.sh; never read a token into the conversation or substitute it into a command.
Step 1: Validate
If $ARGUMENTS is empty, show usage and stop:
Usage: /delete-user <github-username>
Example: /delete-user someuser
Modes (you'll be asked):
revoke — Remove access, keep their contributions
full — Remove access and erase their data
Step 2: Confirm
For confirmation, ask with a structured question when available and permitted in this session; otherwise ask in plain text:
question: "How should {username} be removed from this org?"
header: "Remove mode"
options:
- label: "Revoke access"
description: "Remove repository and hosted membership access. Keep their sessions, artifacts, and contributions in shared memory."
- label: "Full delete"
description: "Revoke access AND erase their sessions, profile, todos, and telemetry. Artifacts and quests are kept but orphaned."
- label: "Cancel"
description: "Don't remove anyone."
If "Cancel", stop with: Cancelled.
Map "Revoke access" → mode=revoke, "Full delete" → mode=full.
Step 3: Remove (credentials stay inside the helper)
Read the non-secret configuration first:
bash bin/config-get.sh slug
Use the printed value as {slug}. If slug is unset or empty, read the fallback:
bash bin/config-get.sh org_name
Use that printed value as {slug} instead. Use the supplied GitHub username as {username} and the confirmed mode (revoke or full) as {mode}. Quote substituted values in single quotes, writing any embedded single quote as '\''.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 24d ago Changed · -5 lines 26c34d2e828c
- 1mo ago First seen · 151 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 0462d5a0f682
delete-user is a skill published in the GitHub repository egregore-labs/egregore (293 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 1,175 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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