Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badinpx agentmods add skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-webWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-web)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-web"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-web.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 101 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00075 | $0.01145 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00573 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00229 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00114 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-web scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sI https://<target> | grep -iE 'content-security-policy|x-frame-options|strict-transport|x-content-type' How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
pentest-web
Web app attack-surface advisory + Burp/ZAP output analysis + OWASP Top 10 methodology. Live exploit composing requires a scope declaration; no automatic exploit execution.
Triggers
- "OWASP Top 10 test"
- "review the Burp output"
- "did we find a SQL injection"
- "let's run an XSS test"
- "can you look for SSRF / IDOR / auth bypass"
- "request smuggling"
OWASP Top 10 Checklist
| # | Category | Test Approach |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Yatay/dikey IDOR, force browse, JWT manipulation |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS config, password hash, sensitive data unencrypted |
| A03 | Injection | SQLi (in-band, blind, OOB), NoSQL, OS command, XPath |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Missing rate limit, business logic flaw |
| A05 | Security Misconfig | Default cred, verbose error, exposed admin panel |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Dependency CVE, framework version |
| A07 | Auth Failures | Brute force, password reset, session fix |
| A08 | Software/Data Integrity | Unsigned update, deserialization |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Bypass detection, audit gap |
| A10 | SSRF | Internal port reach, cloud metadata steal |
Burp/ZAP Output Analysis
If the user pastes a Burp Pro/CE or ZAP report:
## Burp Active Scan — analysis
### True Positive
- High: SQL Injection in /api/users?id= (Time-based, MySQL)
- Payload: `1' AND SLEEP(5)-- -`
- Impact: Full DB read + potential RCE (if FILE priv exists)
- Medium: Reflected XSS in /search?q= (no CSP)
### False Positive (filtered out)
- Info: Server header reveals nginx — not an info leak, low fix priority
- Low: Cookie missing HttpOnly — server-only cookie, no JS access
### Suggested Manual Test
- IDOR check /api/users/{id} — auth bypass attempt
- Race condition /api/purchase (5 parallel requests)
- JWT alg=none + RSA key swap via alg=HS256
Common Methodology Flow
1. Recon: subfinder + httpx + wappalyzer
2. Crawl: ffuf / gobuster / katana (rate-limited)
3. Param discovery: paramspider / Arjun
4. Active probe: nuclei templates + manual Burp
5. Auth test: JWT decode + signature check + algorithm swap
6. Bizlogic: race, IDOR, price manipulation (hand off to pentest-bizlogic)
7. Report: OWASP severity + CVSS + remediation
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 118 lines · 75 tokens per session scan A e73edefc0f79
pentest-web is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 75 tokens to every session and 1,145 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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