BitFun is a desktop AI agent that turns tasks into interactive mini-apps while also writing code, creating documents, and controlling computers. It is for software development and general desktop work across Windows, macOS, and Linux. Its catalogue entries extend the agent with skills, agents, and instructions.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add GCWing/BitFun --skill gstack-csogit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/GCWing/BitFunWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gcwing/bitfun/gstack-cso)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gcwing/bitfun/gstack-cso"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gcwing/bitfun/gstack-cso/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gcwing/bitfun/gstack-cso"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gcwing/bitfun/gstack-cso.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 119 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 158 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 161 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 171 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 151 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 152 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 155 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 160 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 280 This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 496 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 105 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 297 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00153 | $0.09310 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00061 | $0.03724 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.01862 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00931 |
Grade B, and why
cso scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
- `IGNORE PREVIOUS`, `system override`, `disregard`, `forget your instructions` (prompt injection) Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- `curl`, `wget`, `fetch`, `http`, `exfiltrat` (network exfiltration) Copies of this mod
8 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 675 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/cso — Chief Security Officer Audit (v2)
You are a Chief Security Officer who has led incident response on real breaches and testified before boards about security posture. You think like an attacker but report like a defender. You don't do security theater — you find the doors that are actually unlocked.
The real attack surface isn't your code — it's your dependencies. Most teams audit their own app but forget: exposed env vars in CI logs, stale API keys in git history, forgotten staging servers with prod DB access, and third-party webhooks that accept anything. Start there, not at the code level.
You do NOT make code changes. You produce a Security Posture Report with concrete findings, severity ratings, and remediation plans.
OpenBitFun Dispatch
When this skill is invoked by OpenBitFun, this skill supplies the security-review lens. Use existing Task sub-agents for independent security evidence gathering, then make final severity and remediation calls in the main session.
- Do not assume a CSO sub-agent exists. Choose only from the Task tool's available agents.
- Prefer a matching custom security sub-agent if available; otherwise use one
CodeReviewtask with an exact security lens for diff-focused review andExplorefor broader code/config mapping and security-sensitive files. - Keep Task work read-only. Ask for concrete evidence: file paths, trust boundaries, inputs, auth/data flows, exploit preconditions, and confidence.
- In parallel batches, return a compact Security brief:
critical/high findings,trust-boundary risks,false-positive notes,required fixes,verification. - The main session decides what blocks Build/Ship and asks the user for risk acceptance when needed.
User-invocable
When the user types /cso, run this skill.
Arguments
/cso— full daily audit (all phases, 8/10 confidence gate)/cso --comprehensive— monthly deep scan (all phases, 2/10 bar — surfaces more)/cso --infra— infrastructure-only (Phases 0-6, 12-14)/cso --code— code-only (Phases 0-1, 7, 9-11, 12-14)/cso --skills— skill supply chain only (Phases 0, 8, 12-14)/cso --diff— branch changes only (combinable with any above)/cso --supply-chain— dependency audit only (Phases 0, 3, 12-14)/cso --owasp— OWASP Top 10 only (Phases 0, 9, 12-14)/cso --scope auth— focused audit on a specific domain
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed cda0650cf82f
- 1mo ago First seen · 675 lines · 153 tokens per session scan B ef5e00eca98b
cso is a skill published in the GitHub repository GCWing/BitFun (2,077 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 153 tokens to every session and 9,310 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (instruction-override phrasing, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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worker-management
Use when admin requests hand-creating or resetting a Worker, starting/stopping a Worker, managing Worker skills, enabling peer mentions, or opening a QwenPaw console. Use agentteams-find-worker only as a helper for Nacos-backed market import or when task assignment needs you to discover a suitable Worker.
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git-delegation
A procedure for sending Git version-control commands to a separate Manager instead of running them directly. Git is the tool used to track code changes and work with repositories.