Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HezaoHezao/poirot --skill github-code-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HezaoHezao/poirotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hezaohezao/poirot/github-code-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hezaohezao/poirot/github-code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hezaohezao/poirot/github-code-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hezaohezao/poirot/github-code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hezaohezao/poirot/github-code-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 136 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 148 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 179 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 211 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 216 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 177 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 214 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- low Supply Chain · line 134 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- low Supply Chain · line 146 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- low Supply Chain · line 177 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00018 | $0.02097 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00839 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00419 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00210 |
Grade A, and why
github-code-review scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
GitHub. Most of this skill uses plain `git` — the `gh`/`curl` split only How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 289 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Code Review
Perform code reviews on local changes before pushing, or review open PRs on
GitHub. Most of this skill uses plain git — the gh/curl split only
matters for PR-level interactions.
Prerequisites
- Authenticated with GitHub (
GITHUB_TOKENenv var orgh auth login) - Inside a git repository
Setup (for PR interactions)
if command -v gh &>/dev/null && gh auth status &>/dev/null; then
AUTH="gh"
else
AUTH="git"
fi
REMOTE_URL=$(git remote get-url origin)
OWNER_REPO=$(echo "$REMOTE_URL" | sed -E 's|.*github\.com[:/]||; s|\.git$||')
OWNER=$(echo "$OWNER_REPO" | cut -d/ -f1)
REPO=$(echo "$OWNER_REPO" | cut -d/ -f2)
1. Reviewing Local Changes (Pre-Push)
This is pure git — works everywhere, no API needed.
Get the Diff
# Staged changes (what would be committed)
git diff --staged
# All changes vs main (what a PR would contain)
git diff main...HEAD
# File names only
git diff main...HEAD --name-only
# Stat summary (insertions/deletions per file)
git diff main...HEAD --stat
Review Strategy
- Get the big picture first:
git diff main...HEAD --stat
git log main..HEAD --oneline
- Review file by file — use
read_fileon changed files for full context:
git diff main...HEAD -- src/auth/login.py
- Check for common issues:
# Debug statements, TODOs, console.logs left behind
git diff main...HEAD | grep -n "print(\|console\.log\|TODO\|FIXME\|HACK\|XXX\|debugger"
# Large files accidentally staged
git diff main...HEAD --stat | sort -t'|' -k2 -rn | head -10
# Secrets or credential patterns
git diff main...HEAD | grep -in "password\|secret\|api_key\|token.*=\|private_key"
# Merge conflict markers
git diff main...HEAD | grep -n "<<<<<<\|>>>>>>\|======="
- Present structured feedback to the user.
Review Output Format
## Code Review Summary
### Critical
- **src/auth.py:45** — SQL injection: user input passed directly to query.
Suggestion: Use parameterized queries.
### Warnings
- **src/models/user.py:23** — Password stored in plaintext. Use bcrypt or argon2.
- **src/api/routes.py:112** — No rate limiting on login endpoint.
### Suggestions
- **src/utils/helpers.py:8** — Duplicates logic in `src/core/utils.py:34`. Consolidate.
- **tests/test_auth.py** — Missing edge case: expired token test.
### Looks Good
- Clean separation of concerns in the middleware layer
- Good test coverage for the happy path
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 289 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A 4a2237dcee72
github-code-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository HezaoHezao/poirot (251 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 2,097 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
commit
Atomic git commit with conventional message. Use when the user says "commit", "save my changes", "commit this", or wants to create a git commit. Stages specific files, writes a conventional commit message with body explaining non-obvious decisions. Never uses git add -A.
gh-address-comments
Address actionable GitHub pull request review feedback. Use when the user wants to inspect unresolved review threads, requested changes, or inline review comments on a PR, then implement selected fixes.
hqe
Comprehensive codebase health auditing, remediation, and verification skill based on the canonical HQE Protocol v5.0.0.
pipeline-conductor
Operating procedure for the kirocrew-pipeline-conductor agent. Use when a pipeline conductor session is seeded, inspected or debugged. You MANAGE one issue/PR pipeline on one repo: two columns per item (session working? item solved?), send intent, never re-derive a red yourself.
sage-review
Deep, platform-neutral code review for PRs and CRs in ONE thorough single pass — design reasoning (Problem Worth Solving & Solution Fit) as one dimension alongside the 9 code-level dimensions, with chain-of-consequences, self-critique, and draft-only comments. The single app-owned source of truth.
learn-from-sage
Detection-gap (miss) analysis for Code Review Sage. Learn from shipped fixes, acted-on human comments, and design outcomes to close reviewer blind spots. Inline during review stages a candidate; a human triggers a one-shot AI consolidation into the live ruleset.