Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill privesc-linuxgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/privesc-linux)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/privesc-linux"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/privesc-linux/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/privesc-linux"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/privesc-linux.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 24 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 7 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high YARA Match · line 7 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Tool Misuse · line 49 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 50 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 51 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 102 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 103 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 119 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 120 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 3 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 49 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 50 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 51 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 53 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 80 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 83 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 102 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 103 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 117 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 61 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00084 | $0.02920 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.01460 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00584 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00292 |
Grade B, and why
privesc-linux scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
description: Use when escalating privileges on a Linux host — SUID/SGID & GTFOBins, sudo LPE (CVE-2025-32462/32463), capabilities & LD_PRELOAD, kernel LPE (CVE-2024-1086, Dirty Pipe, GameOver(lay)), service misconfig (Pw How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Linux Privilege Escalation
When to Activate
- Gained an initial unprivileged shell on a Linux host and need root or a higher-privileged account
- Post-exploitation lateral/vertical movement on Linux servers, workstations, CI runners, or appliances
- Container / Kubernetes pod foothold that needs to escape to the host node
- Triaging a host for misconfig-based LPE (SUID, sudo, capabilities, writable units/cron) before reaching for kernel 0-day
- CTF / lab challenges requiring privilege escalation with a defensible, detection-aware methodology
Technique Map
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Automated + manual enumeration (LinPEAS/pspy/LES2) | T1082, T1057 | CWE-200 | references/enumeration-tooling.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| Detection-aware / low-noise enumeration | T1082 | CWE-200 | references/enumeration-tooling.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| SUID/SGID binary abuse (GTFOBins) | T1548.001 | CWE-269 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/cap_suid_hunter.sh |
| sudo misconfig + GTFOBins escape | T1548.003 | CWE-269 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/cap_suid_hunter.sh |
| sudo host option LPE (CVE-2025-32462) | T1548.003 | CWE-863 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/sudo_cve_2025_check.sh |
| sudo chroot/NSS LPE (CVE-2025-32463) | T1548.003 | CWE-829 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/sudo_cve_2025_check.sh |
| Linux capabilities abuse (setuid/dac_read/sys_admin) | T1548 | CWE-250 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/cap_suid_hunter.sh |
| LD_PRELOAD / LD_LIBRARY_PATH sudo hijack | T1574.006 | CWE-426 | references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md | scripts/cap_suid_hunter.sh |
| nf_tables double-free LPE (CVE-2024-1086) | T1068 | CWE-416 | references/kernel-exploits.md | scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py |
| io_uring memory-sharing LPE (CVE-2024-0582/2025-21836) | T1068 | CWE-416 | references/kernel-exploits.md | scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py |
| Dirty Pipe page-cache overwrite (CVE-2022-0847) | T1068 | CWE-787 | references/kernel-exploits.md | scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py |
| GameOver(lay) OverlayFS (CVE-2023-2640/32629) | T1068 | CWE-269 | references/kernel-exploits.md | scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py |
| udisks/libblockdev loop-mount LPE (CVE-2025-6019) | T1068 | CWE-250 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| PAM allow_active bypass (CVE-2025-6018) | T1068 | CWE-863 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| glibc ld.so Looney Tunables (CVE-2023-4911) | T1068 | CWE-787 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py |
| polkit pkexec PwnKit (CVE-2021-4034) | T1548.001 | CWE-787 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| Cron/systemd/PATH/writable-file abuse | T1053.003, T1574.007 | CWE-732 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| NFS no_root_squash SUID drop | T1222.002 | CWE-732 | references/service-misconfig-lpe.md | scripts/linpriv_enum.py |
| runc fd-leak container escape (CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/container-namespace-escape.md | scripts/container_escape_check.sh |
| Docker socket / privileged container escape | T1611, T1610 | CWE-269 | references/container-namespace-escape.md | scripts/container_escape_check.sh |
| cgroup release_agent / CAP_SYS_ADMIN escape | T1611 | CWE-269 | references/container-namespace-escape.md | scripts/container_escape_check.sh |
| Kubernetes pod/token escape | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/container-namespace-escape.md | scripts/container_escape_check.sh |
What ships with it
10 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/container-namespace-escape.md 11 KB
- references/enumeration-tooling.md 9.7 KB
- references/kernel-exploits.md 12 KB
- references/service-misconfig-lpe.md 11 KB
- references/suid-sudo-capabilities.md 12 KB
- scripts/cap_suid_hunter.sh 6.0 KB runs code
- scripts/container_escape_check.sh 7.4 KB runs code
- scripts/kernel_exploit_suggester.py 11 KB runs code
- scripts/linpriv_enum.py 22 KB runs code
- scripts/sudo_cve_2025_check.sh 5.4 KB runs code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 121 lines · 84 tokens per session scan B d099b698077d
privesc-linux is a skill published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (357 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 84 tokens to every session and 2,920 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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