Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude --skill threat-huntinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/threat-hunting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/threat-hunting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/threat-hunting/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/threat-hunting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude/threat-hunting.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to critical
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- critical YARA Match · line 119 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.02618 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01309 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00524 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00262 |
Grade A, and why
threat-hunting scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Hunting & Detection Engineering
When to Activate
- Hypothesis-driven hunting across endpoint, network, cloud, and identity telemetry
- Writing & shipping detections (Sigma + correlation) as version-controlled code in CI
- Mapping & measuring coverage against MITRE ATT&CK v18 (Detection Strategies / Analytics)
- Hunting Windows post-exploitation: ETW/AMSI tampering, LSASS dumping, LOLBins, injection
- Hunting C2 in encrypted traffic: JA4+/JA4X fingerprints, beaconing, DNS tunneling
- Hunting cloud-identity attacks: Entra device-code/OAuth phishing, PRT theft, CloudTrail abuse
- Purple-team validation: emulate ATT&CK with Atomic Red Team/Caldera, find detection gaps
- Triaging EVTX/Zeek/CloudTrail offline during IR without a SIEM
Technique Map
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hypothesis-driven hunt loop (PEAK/TaHiTI) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | - |
| ATT&CK v18 Detection-Strategies / Analytics mapping | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
| Detection-as-Code CI (lint + compile) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/methodology-hunt-loop.md | scripts/dac_validate.py |
| Sysmon 15 PPL + tamper/visibility-gap | T1562.001 | CWE-693 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/sysmon_config_2025.xml |
| ETW / AMSI in-memory patch detection | T1562.001, T1562.002 | CWE-693 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| LSASS credential-access handle hunt | T1003.001 | CWE-522 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| LOLBin / process-tree anomaly hunt | T1218, T1105, T1059 | CWE-78 | references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md | scripts/evtx_hunt.py |
| Sigma rule + correlation engineering | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/sigma-rule-engineering.md | scripts/dac_validate.py |
| EVTX triage (Hayabusa/Chainsaw/Velociraptor) | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/sigma-rule-engineering.md | scripts/sigma_pipeline.sh |
| JA4+/JA4X C2 fingerprinting | T1071.001 | CWE-300 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| Beaconing / long-conn / prevalence (RITA-style) | T1071, T1571 | CWE-940 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| DNS tunneling / DGA / DoH abuse | T1071.004, T1572 | CWE-940 | references/network-c2-hunting.md | scripts/beacon_hunter.py |
| Entra device-code / OAuth consent phishing | T1528, T1566 | CWE-287 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/entra_hunt.kql |
| PRT theft / token replay | T1550.001 | CWE-522 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/entra_hunt.kql |
| AWS CloudTrail abuse / log tampering | T1078.004, T1098, T1562.008 | CWE-269 | references/cloud-identity-hunting.md | scripts/cloudtrail_hunt.py |
| Atomic Red Team / Caldera validation | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/purple-team-validation.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
| Coverage matrix + ATT&CK Navigator + gap report | TA0043 | CWE-778 | references/purple-team-validation.md | scripts/coverage_matrix.py |
What ships with it
14 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- references/cloud-identity-hunting.md 9.2 KB
- references/methodology-hunt-loop.md 7.9 KB
- references/network-c2-hunting.md 8.6 KB
- references/purple-team-validation.md 6.4 KB
- references/sigma-rule-engineering.md 9.6 KB
- references/windows-endpoint-hunting.md 11 KB
- scripts/beacon_hunter.py 9.8 KB runs code
- scripts/cloudtrail_hunt.py 7.8 KB runs code
- scripts/coverage_matrix.py 7.2 KB runs code
- scripts/dac_validate.py 6.1 KB runs code
- scripts/entra_hunt.kql 4.8 KB
- scripts/evtx_hunt.py 9.5 KB runs code
- scripts/sigma_pipeline.sh 2.3 KB runs code
- scripts/sysmon_config_2025.xml 6.9 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 122 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A 76328bc8b7b9
threat-hunting is a skill published in the GitHub repository hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude (360 stars, last pushed 26d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 2,618 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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